Today's Passage
This passage describes the initial diplomatic and military maneuvers of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 BCE.
Crawley Translation (1910)
After speaking to this effect, Lamachus nevertheless gave his support to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this Alcibiades sailed in his own vessel across to Messina with proposals of alliance, but met with no success, the inhabitants answering that they could not receive him within their walls, though they would provide him with a market outside. Upon this he sailed back to Rhegium. Immediately upon his return the generals manned and victualled sixty ships out of the whole fleet and coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament behind them at Rhegium with one of their number. Received by the Naxians, they then coasted on to Catana, and being refused admittance by the inhabitants, there being a Syracusan party in the town, went on to the river Terias. Here they bivouacked, and the next day sailed in single file to Syracuse with all their ships except ten which they sent on in front to sail into the great harbour and see if there was any fleet launched, and to proclaim by herald from shipboard that the Athenians were come to restore the Leontines to their country, as being their allies and kinsmen, and that such of them, therefore, as were in Syracuse should leave it without fear and join their friends and benefactors the Athenians. After making this proclamation and reconnoitring the city and the harbours, and the features of the country which they would have to make their base of operations in the war, they sailed back to Catana.
An assembly being held here, the inhabitants refused to receive the armament, but invited the generals to come in and say what they desired; and while Alcibiades was speaking and the citizens were intent on the assembly, the soldiers broke down an ill-walled-up postern gate without being observed, and getting inside the town, flocked into the marketplace. The Syracusan party in the town no sooner saw the army inside than they became frightened and withdrew, not being at all numerous; while the rest voted for an alliance with the Athenians and invited them to fetch the rest of their forces from Rhegium. After this the Athenians sailed to Rhegium, and put off, this time with all the armament, for Catana, and fell to work at their camp immediately upon their arrival.
Modern Translation
Having made this argument, Lamachus nonetheless threw his support behind Alcibiades' strategy. Following this, Alcibiades took his own ship across to Messina to propose an alliance, but was unsuccessful. The Messinians replied that while they could not admit him into their city, they would establish a market for him outside the walls. He then sailed back to Rhegium. Upon his return, the generals immediately equipped and provisioned sixty ships from the entire fleet and sailed along the coast to Naxos, leaving the remainder of the force at Rhegium under one of their colleagues. The Naxians welcomed them, so they continued along the coast to Catana. There, however, they were denied entry because a pro-Syracusan faction controlled the town, so they proceeded to the Terias river. They made camp there for the night, and the next day sailed in column formation toward Syracuse with their entire squadron, except for ten ships sent ahead to enter the great harbor, investigate whether any fleet had been launched, and make a proclamation from their decks. The heralds announced that the Athenians had come to restore the Leontines—their allies and kinsmen—to their homeland, and that any Leontines in Syracuse should feel free to leave and join their friends and benefactors, the Athenians. After delivering this message and surveying the city, its harbors, and the surrounding terrain that would serve as their base for military operations, they returned to Catana.
An assembly convened there, but the citizens refused to admit the entire force, inviting only the generals to enter and present their case. While Alcibiades was addressing the assembly and the citizens were focused on his speech, the soldiers discovered a poorly secured postern gate, broke through undetected, and poured into the marketplace. The pro-Syracusan faction, seeing the army inside, immediately panicked and fled—they were few in number anyway. The remaining citizens voted to ally with Athens and invited them to bring the rest of their forces from Rhegium. The Athenians then sailed back to Rhegium, mobilized their entire armament, and returned to Catana, where they immediately began constructing their military camp.
Historical Context
This passage describes the initial diplomatic and military maneuvers of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 BCE. After internal debate among the three commanders (Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus), Alcibiades' aggressive strategy prevails. The Athenians attempt to secure allies among the Sicilian cities while reconnoitering Syracuse, their ultimate target. The episode at Catana demonstrates typical Greek warfare tactics: while Alcibiades distracts the assembly with rhetoric, soldiers execute a pre-planned infiltration. This deception secures Catana as the Athenian base of operations. The passage illustrates the expedition's precarious position—dependent on finding local allies while facing pro-Syracusan factions in many cities. The proclamation about restoring the Leontines provides ideological cover for what was essentially an imperialist venture.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Sicilian Expedition Strategy
The Athenian commanders debated three strategies: Nicias favored minimal engagement, Lamachus wanted immediate assault on Syracuse, while Alcibiades advocated winning allies first. This passage shows Alcibiades' diplomatic approach in action, though backed by military deception.
Learn more →Greek Naval Warfare
The reconnaissance mission to Syracuse harbor exemplifies Greek naval intelligence gathering. The formation sailing and use of herald ships for proclamations were standard naval practices. Control of harbors was crucial for ancient naval operations.
Learn more →Leontini and Athenian Propaganda
Leontini, an Ionian Greek city, had been conquered by Syracuse in 422 BCE. Athens used the restoration of Leontini as justification for intervention, appealing to ethnic kinship (both were Ionian) and prior alliance to mask imperial ambitions.
Learn more →Assembly Politics in Greek Cities
The Catana episode illustrates how Greek assemblies could be manipulated. While citizens debated in assembly, military action could override democratic deliberation. The presence of partisan factions (pro-Syracuse vs pro-Athens) was typical in Greek poleis.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Alcibiades (20.1-4)
Plutarch describes the same Catana stratagem, emphasizing Alcibiades' cleverness and oratorical skill in distracting the assembly while soldiers infiltrated the city.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (13.4-5)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of the Sicilian expedition's early movements, including the attempts to win over Messina and the establishment of the base at Catana.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Nicias (15-16)
Offers perspective on Nicias's reluctance and the strategic debates among commanders, providing context for why Lamachus ultimately supported Alcibiades despite initially favoring direct assault.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the deception at Catana reflect on Athenian claims to be 'liberating' the Leontines? What does this suggest about the relationship between rhetoric and reality in warfare?
- Why might Lamachus have supported Alcibiades' plan despite initially favoring a direct assault? What does this tell us about command dynamics in the Athenian military?
- Compare the different responses of Messina, Naxos, and Catana to the Athenian overtures. What factors might explain why cities chose to support Athens or Syracuse?
- How does Thucydides' matter-of-fact description of the Catana deception shape our interpretation of Athenian methods? Is he critical, neutral, or approving?