Today's Passage
This passage depicts the crucial Spartan assembly of 432 BCE where the decision for war against Athens was made.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“The long speech of the Athenians I do not pretend to understand. They said a good deal in praise of themselves, but nowhere denied that they are injuring our allies and Peloponnese. And yet if they behaved well against the Mede then, but ill towards us now, they deserve double punishment for having ceased to be good and for having become bad. We meanwhile are the same then and now, and shall not, if we are wise, disregard the wrongs of our allies, or put off till to-morrow the duty of assisting those who must suffer to-day. Others have much money and ships and horses, but we have good allies whom we must not give up to the Athenians, nor by lawsuits and words decide the matter, as it is anything but in word that we are harmed, but render instant and powerful help. And let us not be told that it is fitting for us to deliberate under injustice; long deliberation is rather fitting for those who have injustice in contemplation. Vote therefore, Lacedaemonians, for war, as the honour of Sparta demands, and neither allow the further aggrandizement of Athens, nor betray our allies to ruin, but with the gods let us advance against the aggressors.”
With these words he, as ephor, himself put the question to the assembly of the Lacedaemonians. He said that he could not determine which was the loudest acclamation (their mode of decision is by acclamation not by voting); the fact being that he wished to make them declare their opinion openly and thus to increase their ardour for war. Accordingly he said: “All Lacedaemonians who are of opinion that the treaty has been broken, and that Athens is guilty, leave your seats and go there,” pointing out a certain place; “all who are of the opposite opinion, there.” They accordingly stood up and divided; and those who held that the treaty had been broken were in a decided majority. Summoning the allies, they told them that their opinion was that Athens had been guilty of injustice, but that they wished to convoke all the allies and put it to the vote; in order that they might make war, if they decided to do so, on a common resolution. Having thus gained their point, the delegates returned home at once; the Athenian envoys a little later, when they had dispatched the objects of their mission. This decision of the assembly, judging that the treaty had been broken, was made in the fourteenth year of the thirty years’ truce, which was entered into after the affair of Euboea.
The Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken, and that the war must be declared, not so much because they were persuaded by the arguments of the allies, as because they feared the growth of the power of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them.
Modern Translation
I cannot claim to understand the lengthy speech delivered by the Athenians. While they spoke extensively in self-praise, they never once denied that they are harming our allies and the Peloponnese. If they truly acted honorably against the Persians in the past but now treat us unjustly, they deserve a double penalty—both for abandoning their virtue and for embracing wickedness. We, on the other hand, remain consistent in our principles, both then and now. If we possess any wisdom, we will not ignore the injuries inflicted upon our allies, nor will we postpone until tomorrow the assistance owed to those suffering today. Others may possess vast wealth, fleets, and cavalry, but we have loyal allies whom we must not surrender to Athens. This matter cannot be resolved through legal proceedings and rhetoric when our harm is tangible and real—we must provide immediate and decisive aid. Let no one suggest that prolonged deliberation is appropriate when facing injustice; extended debate suits only those contemplating unjust actions. Therefore, Spartans, vote for war as our honor demands. We must neither permit Athens to grow stronger nor abandon our allies to destruction. With divine support, let us march against our aggressors.
Having spoken thus, Sthenelaidas, in his capacity as ephor, presented the question to the Spartan assembly. He claimed inability to distinguish which side shouted louder (their custom being to decide by acclamation rather than formal voting), though in truth he desired to make them declare their stance publicly, thereby intensifying their enthusiasm for war. He therefore instructed: "All Spartans who believe the treaty has been violated and Athens is culpable, move to that area," indicating a specific location, "while those holding the contrary view, go there." The assembly rose and separated, with those convinced of treaty violation forming a clear majority. After summoning their allies, they announced their judgment that Athens had committed injustice, but expressed their wish to convene all allied states for a vote, ensuring any war declaration would rest on collective agreement. Having achieved their objective, the allied delegates departed immediately, while the Athenian ambassadors left somewhat later after completing their diplomatic mission. This assembly's verdict—that the treaty had been broken—occurred in the fourteenth year of the Thirty Years' Peace established following the Euboean affair.
The Spartans voted for treaty violation and necessary war declaration not primarily due to allied persuasion, but rather from fear of Athens' expanding power, observing that most of Greece had already fallen under Athenian control.
Historical Context
This passage depicts the crucial Spartan assembly of 432 BCE where the decision for war against Athens was made. The speaker is Sthenelaidas, one of the five ephors (executive magistrates) of Sparta, responding to both Athenian envoys who had defended their empire and various allied complaints against Athens. The assembly's vote effectively ended the Thirty Years' Peace signed in 446/5 BCE after the First Peloponnesian War. Thucydides reveals that despite the rhetoric about justice and defending allies, Sparta's real motivation was fear of growing Athenian power. This moment represents the point of no return in Greek interstate relations, as the two leading powers abandoned diplomacy for armed conflict that would engulf the Greek world for nearly three decades.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Spartan Decision-Making
The Spartan assembly (apella) made decisions by acclamation rather than counted votes, with citizens shouting their preference. Ephors like Sthenelaidas presided over these meetings. The physical separation described here was unusual, likely employed to make the war party's majority visually obvious and pressure dissenters.
Learn more →The Thirty Years' Peace
Signed in 446/5 BCE after Athens' defeat at Coronea and revolt in Euboea, this treaty recognized dual hegemony: Sparta on land, Athens at sea. It prohibited defection between the two alliance systems but allowed neutrals to join either side. Its violation provided the legal pretext for the Peloponnesian War.
Learn more →Thucydides on Causation
Thucydides distinguishes between immediate pretexts and underlying causes of war. While Sparta claimed to defend allies' rights, he identifies fear of Athenian power as the 'truest cause.' This analytical approach to historical causation was revolutionary and remains influential in international relations theory.
Learn more →The Ephorate
The five ephors were Sparta's chief executives, elected annually. They could summon assemblies, receive foreign envoys, and even prosecute kings. Sthenelaidas's manipulation of voting procedure shows how ephors could shape policy despite Sparta's theoretically egalitarian decision-making.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29-31)
Plutarch describes the same pre-war tensions from an Athenian perspective, including the Megarian Decree and Pericles' strategy of refusing to make concessions to Spartan demands, viewing them as tests of Athenian resolve.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.39-40)
Diodorus provides an alternative account of the war's origins, emphasizing economic factors and the Megarian Decree more than Thucydides does, while also describing the Spartan assembly's war vote.
Read passage →Aristophanes: Acharnians (lines 515-539)
This comedy, produced in 425 BCE, offers a contemporary Athenian view of the war's causes, satirically attributing it to private grievances and the Megarian Decree, showing how ordinary Athenians understood the conflict's origins.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Sthenelaidas's manipulation of the voting procedure reflect on Spartan democracy? What does this suggest about the tension between democratic ideals and political reality?
- Thucydides claims Sparta's real motive was fear rather than justice. How does this analysis challenge the rhetoric of international relations, both ancient and modern?
- What role does collective memory (the Persian Wars) play in Sthenelaidas's argument? How do nations use historical precedents to justify current policies?
- Is Thucydides suggesting that war was inevitable regardless of the assembly's vote? What does this imply about individual agency versus structural forces in history?