Today's Passage
This passage describes two major Athenian military failures during the period of Athens' greatest imperial expansion (460-445 BCE).
Crawley Translation (1910)
Meanwhile the Athenians in Egypt and their allies were still there, and encountered all the vicissitudes of war. First the Athenians were masters of Egypt, and the King sent Megabazus a Persian to Lacedaemon with money to bribe the Peloponnesians to invade Attica and so draw off the Athenians from Egypt. Finding that the matter made no progress, and that the money was only being wasted, he recalled Megabazus with the remainder of the money, and sent Megabuzus, son of Zopyrus, a Persian, with a large army to Egypt. Arriving by land he defeated the Egyptians and their allies in a battle, and drove the Hellenes out of Memphis, and at length shut them up in the island of Prosopitis, where he besieged them for a year and six months. At last, draining the canal of its waters, which he diverted into another channel, he left their ships high and dry and joined most of the island to the mainland, and then marched over on foot and captured it. Thus the enterprise of the Hellenes came to ruin after six years of war. Of all that large host a few travelling through Libya reached Cyrene in safety, but most of them perished. And thus Egypt returned to its subjection to the King, except Amyrtaeus, the king in the marshes, whom they were unable to capture from the extent of the marsh; the marshmen being also the most warlike of the Egyptians. Inaros, the Libyan king, the sole author of the Egyptian revolt, was betrayed, taken, and crucified. Meanwhile a relieving squadron of fifty vessels had sailed from Athens and the rest of the confederacy for Egypt. They put in to shore at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, in total ignorance of what had occurred. Attacked on the land side by the troops, and from the sea by the Phoenician navy, most of the ships were destroyed; the few remaining being saved by retreat. Such was the end of the great expedition of the Athenians and their allies to Egypt.
Meanwhile Orestes, son of Echecratidas, the Thessalian king, being an exile from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. Taking with them the Boeotians and Phocians their allies, the Athenians marched to Pharsalus in Thessaly. They became masters of the country, though only in the immediate vicinity of the camp; beyond which they could not go for fear of the Thessalian cavalry. But they failed to take the city or to attain any of the other objects of their expedition, and returned home with Orestes without having effected anything. Not long after this a thousand of the Athenians embarked in the vessels that were at Pegae (Pegae, it must be remembered, was now theirs), and sailed along the coast to Sicyon under the command of Pericles, son of Xanthippus. Landing in Sicyon and defeating the Sicyonians who engaged them, they immediately took with them the Achaeans and, sailing across, marched against and laid siege to Oeniadae in Acarnania. Failing however to take it, they returned home.
Modern Translation
During this time, the Athenians and their allies remained in Egypt, experiencing the full range of wartime fortunes. Initially, the Athenians controlled Egypt, prompting the Persian King to dispatch Megabazus to Sparta with funds to bribe the Peloponnesians into attacking Attica, thereby forcing the Athenians to withdraw from Egypt. When this scheme proved ineffective and wasteful, the King recalled Megabazus along with the remaining money. He then sent Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus, to Egypt with a substantial army. Arriving overland, Megabyzus defeated the Egyptian forces and their allies in battle, expelled the Greeks from Memphis, and ultimately trapped them on the island of Prosopitis, where he besieged them for eighteen months. Eventually, he diverted the canal waters into another channel, leaving their ships stranded on dry land and connecting most of the island to the mainland. He then crossed on foot and captured the position. Thus ended the Greek expedition after six years of warfare. Of the massive force, only a handful survived the journey through Libya to reach Cyrene; the majority perished. Egypt once again fell under Persian rule, with the exception of Amyrtaeus, the marsh king, who remained uncaptured due to the vast expanse of the marshlands and the exceptional military prowess of the marsh-dwellers. Inaros, the Libyan king who had initiated the Egyptian rebellion, was betrayed, captured, and crucified. Meanwhile, a relief fleet of fifty ships from Athens and the allied states sailed to Egypt. Completely unaware of the disaster, they anchored at the Mendesian mouth of the Nile. Attacked simultaneously by land forces and the Phoenician fleet, most vessels were destroyed; only a few escaped through retreat. Such was the catastrophic conclusion of the ambitious Athenian and allied expedition to Egypt.
Meanwhile, Orestes, son of Echecratidas and the exiled Thessalian king, convinced the Athenians to support his restoration. Accompanied by their Boeotian and Phocian allies, the Athenians marched to Pharsalus in Thessaly. They gained control of the immediate area around their camp but could venture no further due to the threat of Thessalian cavalry. They failed to capture the city or achieve any of their expedition's objectives, returning home with Orestes having accomplished nothing. Shortly afterward, a thousand Athenians boarded ships stationed at Pegae (which was now under their control) and sailed along the coast to Sicyon under Pericles, son of Xanthippus. After landing and defeating the Sicyonian forces that engaged them, they immediately joined with the Achaeans, sailed across, and marched to besiege Oeniadae in Acarnania. Unable to capture it, they returned home.
Historical Context
This passage describes two major Athenian military failures during the period of Athens' greatest imperial expansion (460-445 BCE). The Egyptian expedition (460-454 BCE) was Athens' most ambitious attempt to extend its power beyond the Aegean, supporting an Egyptian revolt against Persian rule. The catastrophic defeat, involving perhaps 200 ships and 40,000 men, marked a turning point in Athenian imperial policy. The subsequent Thessalian expedition shows Athens pivoting back to Greek affairs but still overextending itself. These events occur during the 'First Peloponnesian War' between Athens and Sparta, before the main conflict Thucydides chronicles. The passage illustrates the dangers of imperial overreach and the limits of Athenian power when confronting the Persian Empire directly.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Persian Military Strategy
The Persian response demonstrates sophisticated strategy: first attempting diplomacy and bribery, then overwhelming force. The siege of Prosopitis showcases Persian engineering prowess - diverting the Nile to strand the Greek fleet was a masterful tactical innovation that neutralized Athens' naval advantage.
Learn more →Athenian Imperialism
The Egyptian expedition represents the apex of Athenian imperial ambition, attempting to establish influence far beyond the Aegean. This disaster forced Athens to adopt a more defensive strategy and contributed to the eventual Peace of Callias with Persia around 449 BCE.
Learn more →Inaros and Egyptian Resistance
Inaros II was a Libyan prince who led the Egyptian revolt against Persian rule circa 460 BCE. His rebellion initially succeeded with Athenian support, controlling Lower Egypt for several years before Persian forces crushed the revolt. His crucifixion exemplified Persian punishment for rebellion.
Learn more →Pericles' Early Career
This passage shows Pericles in his early military career, before becoming Athens' dominant statesman. His cautious leadership at Sicyon, avoiding major risks after the Egyptian disaster, foreshadows his later defensive strategy during the Peloponnesian War proper.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (11.71-77)
Provides a more detailed account of the Egyptian expedition, including specific battle descriptions and casualty figures. Diodorus claims 50,000 Greeks participated and nearly all perished.
Read passage →Ctesias: Persica (Fragments 14.36-39)
Offers the Persian perspective on the Egyptian revolt, though Ctesias is often unreliable. He provides different details about Inaros's capture and execution.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (10-11)
Describes Pericles' early military commands including the Sicyon expedition. Plutarch emphasizes Pericles' growing reputation and careful leadership style following the Egyptian disaster.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the Egyptian disaster illustrate the limits of naval power when operating far from home bases? What parallels exist with modern military overextension?
- Why might Thucydides include these failed expeditions in his history? What lessons about power and ambition do they convey?
- Compare the Persian King's initial attempt at bribery versus military action. What does this suggest about ancient diplomatic strategies?
- How does the fate of the relief squadron (destroyed in ignorance of the main force's defeat) reflect problems of ancient communication and intelligence?