Today's Passage
This passage marks the crucial transition from the Pentecontaetia (the fifty-year period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars) to the immediate causes of war in 432 BCE.
Crawley Translation (1910)
After this, though not many years later, we at length come to what has been already related, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidæa, and the events that served as a pretext for the present war. All these actions of the Hellenes against each other and the barbarian occurred in the fifty years’ interval between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of the present war. During this interval the Athenians succeeded in placing their empire on a firmer basis, and advanced their own home power to a very great height. The Lacedaemonians, though fully aware of it, opposed it only for a little while, but remained inactive during most of the period, being of old slow to go to war except under the pressure of necessity, and in the present instance being hampered by wars at home; until the growth of the Athenian power could be no longer ignored, and their own confederacy became the object of its encroachments. They then felt that they could endure it no longer, but that the time had come for them to throw themselves heart and soul upon the hostile power, and break it, if they could, by commencing the present war. And though the Lacedaemonians had made up their own minds on the fact of the breach of the treaty and the guilt of the Athenians, yet they sent to Delphi and inquired of the God whether it would be well with them if they went to war; and, as it is reported, received from him the answer that if they put their whole strength into the war, victory would be theirs, and the promise that he himself would be with them, whether invoked or uninvoked. Still they wished to summon their allies again, and to take their vote on the propriety of making war. After the ambassadors from the confederates had arrived and a congress had been convened, they all spoke their minds, most of them denouncing the Athenians and demanding that the war should begin. In particular the Corinthians. They had before on their own account canvassed the cities in detail to induce them to vote for the war, in the fear that it might come too late to save Potidæa; they were present also on this occasion, and came forward the last, and made the following speech:
Modern Translation
After these events, though not many years passed, we finally arrive at the incidents already described—the Corcyraean and Potidaean affairs that provided the immediate pretext for this war. All these Greek actions, whether against fellow Greeks or barbarians, took place during the fifty-year period between Xerxes' withdrawal and the outbreak of the current conflict. Throughout this time, the Athenians systematically strengthened their empire's foundations while elevating their domestic power to extraordinary heights. The Spartans, despite being fully conscious of this development, mounted only token resistance, remaining largely passive throughout most of the period. This inaction stemmed partly from their traditional reluctance to wage war unless absolutely compelled, and partly from domestic conflicts that constrained their options. Eventually, however, Athenian power grew so conspicuous, and their encroachments upon Sparta's own alliance became so brazen, that further tolerance became impossible. The Spartans concluded that the moment had arrived to commit themselves completely to destroying this threatening power, if possible, by initiating the present war. Although the Spartans had already convinced themselves that the treaty had been violated and that Athens bore responsibility, they nevertheless consulted the oracle at Delphi, asking whether war would bring them success. The god reportedly assured them that victory would be theirs if they fought with full commitment, and promised his support whether they invoked him or not. Despite this divine endorsement, they still wished to reconvene their allies to vote on whether to declare war. When the allied representatives assembled in congress, they voiced their opinions, with most condemning Athens and urging immediate hostilities. The Corinthians were particularly prominent. Having already lobbied individual cities extensively to secure pro-war votes—fearing that delay might doom Potidaea—they now appeared at this assembly and spoke last, delivering the following address:
Historical Context
This passage marks the crucial transition from the Pentecontaetia (the fifty-year period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars) to the immediate causes of war in 432 BCE. Thucydides describes how Athens' imperial expansion finally provoked Sparta into action after decades of reluctance. The Spartans, having already voted for war internally, seek divine sanction from Delphi and then convene the Peloponnesian League to secure allied support. The Corinthians, whose commercial interests were directly threatened by Athens' support for Corcyra and whose colony Potidaea was under siege, emerge as the most vocal advocates for war. This congress represents the final diplomatic step before the formal declaration of hostilities that would engulf the Greek world for nearly three decades.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
The Pentecontaetia
The fifty-year period (479-431 BCE) between the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War, during which Athens transformed the Delian League into an empire. Thucydides provides our main historical account of this crucial period of Athenian expansion and the growing tensions with Sparta.
Learn more →Delphic Oracle
The most prestigious oracle in ancient Greece, located at Delphi. Its pronouncements carried enormous weight in political and military decisions. The oracle's promise of victory to Sparta, with divine support 'whether invoked or uninvoked,' provided crucial religious legitimacy for the war.
Learn more →Spartan Foreign Policy
Sparta's conservative approach to foreign affairs reflected its unique social system. The need to control their helot population and their traditional isolationism made Spartans reluctant to engage in distant campaigns, explaining their delayed response to Athenian expansion.
Learn more →Peloponnesian League
The alliance system led by Sparta, formally requiring member states to 'have the same friends and enemies' as Sparta. Unlike Athens' empire, it was nominally a partnership of equals, though Sparta clearly dominated. This congress shows the alliance's decision-making process in action.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29-31)
Plutarch provides additional details about the Megarian Decree and Pericles' role in escalating tensions, offering a more personality-driven account of the war's origins that complements Thucydides' structural analysis.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.38-40)
Diodorus offers an alternative chronology of the war's outbreak and provides details about the Spartan decision-making process not found in Thucydides, though his account is generally considered less reliable.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (2.2.3)
Though dealing with the war's end, Xenophon reflects on its causes and the role of Spartan-Athenian rivalry, providing a retrospective view that illuminates how Greeks understood the conflict's origins after its conclusion.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Thucydides' characterization of Spartan 'slowness' to war reflect cultural differences between Athens and Sparta? Is this portrayed as a weakness or a strength?
- What role does religious authority (the Delphic oracle) play in legitimizing political decisions? How might this compare to modern uses of moral or ideological justification for war?
- Why do you think Thucydides emphasizes that the Spartans sought allied approval even after receiving divine sanction? What does this reveal about Greek interstate relations?
- How does the Corinthians' pre-congress lobbying campaign reflect the democratic elements within the Peloponnesian League? What are the implications for understanding alliance politics?