Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 65 of 506 Book 1, Chapter 5 January 28, 2026
13% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage is from a speech by the Corinthian delegates at the Congress at Sparta in 432 BCE, just before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

Crawley Translation (1910)

“To apply these rules to ourselves, if we are now kindling war it is under the pressure of injury, with adequate grounds of complaint; and after we have chastised the Athenians we will in season desist. We have many reasons to expect success—first, superiority in numbers and in military experience, and secondly our general and unvarying obedience in the execution of orders. The naval strength which they possess shall be raised by us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the moneys at Olympia and Delphi. A loan from these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. A single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their ruin: should they hold out, in that case there will be the more time for us to exercise ourselves in naval matters; and as soon as we have arrived at an equality in science, we need scarcely ask whether we shall be their superiors in courage. For the advantages that we have by nature they cannot acquire by education; while their superiority in science must be removed by our practice. The money required for these objects shall be provided by our contributions: nothing indeed could be more monstrous than the suggestion that, while their allies never tire of contributing for their own servitude, we should refuse to spend for vengeance and self-preservation the treasure which by such refusal we shall forfeit to Athenian rapacity and see employed for our own ruin.

Modern Translation

To apply these principles to our current situation: if we are now initiating war, it is because we have been wronged and have legitimate grievances. Once we have punished the Athenians, we will cease hostilities at the appropriate time. We have numerous reasons to anticipate victory. First, we possess superior numbers and greater military expertise; second, we demonstrate consistent and unwavering discipline in following commands. As for the naval forces they currently possess, we shall match them using our existing resources and funds from the treasuries at Olympia and Delphi. With loans from these sacred funds, we can lure away their foreign sailors by offering better wages. Athens's power depends more on hired mercenaries than on citizen loyalty, whereas our strength faces no such vulnerability, resting as it does on manpower rather than wealth. A single naval defeat would likely spell their doom. Should they manage to survive, we would gain more time to develop our naval skills. Once we achieve parity in naval expertise, our natural superiority in valor will surely prevail. The inherent advantages we possess cannot be taught to them, while we can eliminate their technical superiority through dedicated training. We shall fund these preparations through our contributions. It would be utterly absurd if, while their allies tirelessly pay to maintain their own subjugation, we should hesitate to spend money on righteous vengeance and self-defense—funds that would otherwise fall into Athenian hands through plunder and be turned against us for our own destruction.

Historical Context

This passage is from a speech by the Corinthian delegates at the Congress at Sparta in 432 BCE, just before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The Corinthians are attempting to persuade the Spartans and their allies to declare war on Athens. They are responding to Spartan hesitation about challenging Athenian naval supremacy. The speech addresses practical concerns about financing and conducting a war against Athens's maritime empire. The reference to borrowing from temple treasuries at Olympia and Delphi shows the sacred dimension of Greek warfare. This speech is crucial in Thucydides' narrative as it articulates the Peloponnesian strategy that would ultimately fail: attempting to defeat Athens at sea by building a competitive navy.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Temple Treasuries in Greek Warfare

Greek temples served as banks, storing vast wealth in dedications and offerings. During emergencies, states could borrow these funds for military purposes. Olympia and Delphi were the wealthiest sanctuaries in Greece, making them attractive sources of war financing.

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Athenian Naval Power

Athens's navy consisted of approximately 300 triremes manned by citizen rowers and foreign mercenaries. Their naval superiority was based on technical skill, experience, and financial resources from their empire, making them nearly invincible at sea in 432 BCE.

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Mercenary Forces in Classical Greece

While citizen-soldiers formed the core of most Greek armies, mercenaries became increasingly important, especially for naval operations. Athens could afford foreign rowers due to tribute from their empire, while Sparta relied more heavily on citizen forces and allied contingents.

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Spartan Military Excellence

The speaker appeals to traditional Spartan confidence in their superior discipline and courage. Spartans underwent rigorous military training from age seven through the agoge system, producing professional soldiers unmatched in land warfare but inexperienced at sea.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29.1-4)

Describes Pericles' naval strategy and Athens's financial reserves, including the use of sacred treasures, providing the Athenian perspective on the same strategic considerations.

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Xenophon: Hellenica (1.6.24)

Discusses later Spartan attempts to build naval power with Persian gold, showing how the strategy outlined here eventually succeeded only with foreign financial support.

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Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.39-40)

Provides an alternative account of the debates leading to war, including discussion of financial preparations and the role of Corinth in pushing for conflict.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does the Corinthian speaker's confidence in borrowing from temple treasuries reflect Greek attitudes toward the relationship between religion and warfare?
  2. The speaker argues that courage is natural while technical skill can be learned. How does this reflect broader Greek ideas about nature (physis) versus convention/learning (nomos)?
  3. Why might Thucydides include this detailed discussion of financial strategy? What does it reveal about the changing nature of warfare in the late 5th century?
  4. The Corinthians predict that 'a single defeat at sea' would ruin Athens. Why was this prediction ultimately wrong, and what does this reveal about the limits of strategic planning?