Today's Passage
This passage appears in Book 1 as part of a speech by Pericles to the Athenian assembly in 432 BCE, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“As to the war and the resources of either party, a detailed comparison will not show you the inferiority of Athens. Personally engaged in the cultivation of their land, without funds either private or public, the Peloponnesians are also without experience in long wars across sea, from the strict limit which poverty imposes on their attacks upon each other. Powers of this description are quite incapable of often manning a fleet or often sending out an army: they cannot afford the absence from their homes, the expenditure from their own funds; and besides, they have not command of the sea. Capital, it must be remembered, maintains a war more than forced contributions. Farmers are a class of men that are always more ready to serve in person than in purse. Confident that the former will survive the dangers, they are by no means so sure that the latter will not be prematurely exhausted, especially if the war last longer than they expect, which it very likely will. In a single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies may be able to defy all Hellas, but they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power different in character from their own, by the want of the single council-chamber requisite to prompt and vigorous action, and the substitution of a diet composed of various races, in which every state possesses an equal vote, and each presses its own ends, a condition of things which generally results in no action at all. The great wish of some is to avenge themselves on some particular enemy, the great wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they devote a very small fraction of the time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his neglect, that it is the business of somebody else to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays.
Modern Translation
Regarding the war and each side's resources, a careful analysis will demonstrate that Athens is not inferior. The Peloponnesians, who work their own farms and lack both private wealth and public treasuries, have no experience with lengthy overseas campaigns, since poverty restricts them to brief conflicts among themselves. Such powers are fundamentally unable to repeatedly deploy fleets or dispatch armies: they cannot sustain prolonged absences from home or bear the financial burden from their own resources; moreover, they lack naval supremacy. Remember that accumulated capital, rather than emergency levies, sustains warfare. Farmers are invariably more willing to risk their lives than their money. While confident they'll survive combat, they fear their funds will be depleted prematurely, particularly if the war extends beyond expectations—as seems probable. Though the Peloponnesians and their allies might prevail in a single engagement against all Greece, they cannot prosecute a war against an adversary of fundamentally different character. They lack the unified command structure necessary for decisive action, instead relying on a confederate assembly of diverse peoples where each state holds equal voting rights and pursues its own interests—circumstances that typically produce paralysis. Some members prioritize revenge against specific enemies, others focus on protecting their finances. They assemble slowly and dedicate minimal time to collective concerns, spending most sessions advancing private agendas. Each assumes others will handle common responsibilities, believing their personal negligence harmless; thus, through this universal attitude of individual irresponsibility, their shared enterprise gradually deteriorates.
Historical Context
This passage appears in Book 1 as part of a speech by Pericles to the Athenian assembly in 432 BCE, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War. Pericles is responding to Spartan demands and analyzing why Athens should be confident in the coming conflict. He contrasts Athens' naval empire, financial reserves, and unified decision-making with the Peloponnesian League's agricultural economy, poverty, and cumbersome alliance structure. This strategic assessment would prove largely accurate: Athens' naval power and wealth allowed it to pursue Pericles' strategy of avoiding land battles while using sea power to raid enemy territory. The passage reveals Thucydides' interest in the relationship between economic systems, political structures, and military capabilities.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Athenian Naval Power
Athens' thalassocracy (naval empire) was built on tribute from allied cities, silver mines at Laurion, and extensive maritime trade. This gave Athens unique strategic flexibility and the ability to project power across the Aegean, contrasting sharply with Sparta's land-based military tradition.
Learn more →Spartan Alliance System
The Peloponnesian League operated through consensus among autonomous allies, each with equal votes. This democratic structure among oligarchic states created the decision-making paralysis Pericles describes, contrasting with Athens' centralized imperial administration.
Learn more →Ancient Greek Agriculture
Most Peloponnesian hoplites were farmer-soldiers who needed to return home for planting and harvest. This seasonal constraint limited Sparta's ability to maintain long sieges or distant campaigns, a vulnerability Pericles planned to exploit.
Learn more →Collective Action Problems
Pericles identifies what modern political scientists call the 'free rider problem' and 'tragedy of the commons.' His analysis of how individual rational choices lead to collective irrationality remains influential in political theory.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Aristotle: Politics (Book 6, Chapter 1)
Aristotle analyzes how different economic bases (agricultural vs. commercial) create different political systems and military capabilities, echoing Thucydides' contrast between Athens and Sparta.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (Chapter 33)
Plutarch describes Pericles' strategy of avoiding land battles and relying on Athens' financial reserves and naval power, directly implementing the analysis presented in this speech.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 2, Chapter 2)
Xenophon describes how Spartan victory ultimately required Persian gold to build a fleet, confirming Pericles' analysis that capital, not just courage, determines military success.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Pericles' analysis of the relationship between economic systems and military power apply to modern conflicts?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of democratic versus autocratic decision-making in wartime?
- Does Thucydides present Pericles' confidence as justified, or does the eventual Athenian defeat suggest hubris?
- How does the 'collective action problem' Pericles identifies still affect international alliances today?