Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 79 of 506 Book 1, Chapter 5 February 11, 2026
16% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage comes from Pericles' famous speech to the Athenian assembly in 432/431 BCE, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War.

Crawley Translation (1910)

“But the principal point is the hindrance that they will experience from want of money. The slowness with which it comes in will cause delay; but the opportunities of war wait for no man. Again, we need not be alarmed either at the possibility of their raising fortifications in Attica, or at their navy. It would be difficult for any system of fortifications to establish a rival city, even in time of peace, much more, surely, in an enemy’s country, with Athens just as much fortified against it as it against Athens; while a mere post might be able to do some harm to the country by incursions and by the facilities which it would afford for desertion, but can never prevent our sailing into their country and raising fortifications there, and making reprisals with our powerful fleet. For our naval skill is of more use to us for service on land, than their military skill for service at sea. Familiarity with the sea they will not find an easy acquisition. If you who have been practising at it ever since the Median invasion have not yet brought it to perfection, is there any chance of anything considerable being effected by an agricultural, unseafaring population, who will besides be prevented from practising by the constant presence of strong squadrons of observation from Athens? With a small squadron they might hazard an engagement, encouraging their ignorance by numbers; but the restraint of a strong force will prevent their moving, and through want of practice they will grow more clumsy, and consequently more timid. It must be kept in mind that seamanship, just like anything else, is a matter of art, and will not admit of being taken up occasionally as an occupation for times of leisure; on the contrary, it is so exacting as to leave leisure for nothing else.

“Even if they were to touch the moneys at Olympia or Delphi, and try to seduce our foreign sailors by the temptation of higher pay, that would only be a serious danger if we could not still be a match for them by embarking our own citizens and the aliens resident among us. But in fact by this means we are always a match for them; and, best of all, we have a larger and higher class of native coxswains and sailors among our own citizens than all the rest of Hellas. And to say nothing of the danger of such a step, none of our foreign sailors would consent to become an outlaw from his country, and to take service with them and their hopes, for the sake of a few days’ high pay.

Modern Translation

The crucial issue is the obstacle they'll face from lack of funds. The slow accumulation of money will create delays, but the critical moments of war don't wait for anyone. Furthermore, we shouldn't worry about them building fortifications in Attica or about their naval forces. Establishing a fortified rival city would be challenging even in peacetime—far more so in hostile territory, especially with Athens equally fortified against them. While a simple garrison might inflict some damage through raids and by encouraging deserters, it could never stop us from sailing to their territory, building our own fortifications, and retaliating with our formidable fleet. Our maritime expertise serves us better on land than their land-based military skills serve them at sea. They won't easily acquire naval proficiency. If you Athenians, who have been training since the Persian invasion, haven't yet perfected it, what hope does an agricultural, landlocked population have? Moreover, they'll be prevented from practicing by our constant patrols of powerful observation squadrons. They might risk an engagement with a small fleet, their inexperience emboldened by numbers, but a substantial force will immobilize them. Without practice, they'll become increasingly clumsy and therefore more fearful. Remember that seamanship, like any skill, is an art form that cannot be pursued casually in spare moments; rather, it demands such dedication that it leaves time for nothing else.

Even if they accessed the sacred treasuries at Olympia or Delphi and attempted to bribe our foreign sailors with higher wages, this would only pose a serious threat if we couldn't match them by mobilizing our own citizens and resident aliens. But we can always equal them through these means. Most importantly, we possess more numerous and superior native helmsmen and sailors among our citizens than all other Greek states combined. Setting aside the risks of such treachery, none of our foreign sailors would choose to become outlaws from their homelands and join them with their doubtful prospects, merely for a few days of increased pay.

Historical Context

This passage comes from Pericles' famous speech to the Athenian assembly in 432/431 BCE, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War. Pericles, Athens' leading statesman, is addressing concerns about Spartan military capabilities and reassuring the Athenians about their strategic advantages. He systematically dismantles fears about Spartan fortifications, naval development, and financial resources. The speech emphasizes Athens' overwhelming naval superiority and the impossibility of the land-based Spartans quickly developing comparable maritime skills. Pericles also addresses the theoretical threat of Sparta using sacred temple treasures to hire away Athens' sailors. This forms part of his broader strategy to convince the Athenians to adopt a defensive strategy, abandoning the countryside to Spartan invasion while relying on their walls and naval dominance.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Sacred Treasuries

The treasuries at Olympia and Delphi held vast wealth dedicated to the gods. Using these funds for war would be sacrilege, but desperate states sometimes considered it. These treasuries functioned as proto-banks in the Greek world, and their violation would have religious and political consequences.

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Athenian Naval Supremacy

Athens' navy of approximately 300 triremes was the largest in Greece. Each trireme required 170 rowers, creating enormous manpower needs. Athens' democratic system and maritime economy produced skilled sailors, while Sparta's agricultural society lacked naval expertise.

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Median Invasion

Reference to the Persian Wars (490-479 BCE), called 'Median' by Greeks who often confused Medes and Persians. Athens' naval development accelerated after this conflict, particularly following Themistocles' naval program and the victory at Salamis.

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Metics (Resident Aliens)

Foreign residents in Athens who lacked citizenship but participated in economic life and military service. Many metics were skilled craftsmen and traders who could serve in the fleet, providing Athens with additional maritime expertise beyond its citizen body.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Plutarch: Life of Pericles (33.2-4)

Plutarch describes Pericles' naval strategy and confidence in Athenian sea power, including his famous statement that the Peloponnesians were 'mere farmers' who could never match Athens at sea.

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Xenophon: Constitution of the Athenians (2.2-8)

Pseudo-Xenophon analyzes Athens' naval advantages and how sea power allowed them to strike anywhere while being invulnerable to land invasion, echoing Pericles' strategic vision.

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Aristotle: Politics (1327a-b)

Discusses how maritime states develop different political systems and military capabilities than agricultural ones, providing theoretical framework for understanding Athens-Sparta dichotomy.

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Discussion Questions

  1. How does Pericles' confidence in Athenian naval supremacy reflect broader assumptions about the relationship between political systems and military capabilities?
  2. What are the ethical implications of Pericles' discussion of using sacred temple funds for military purposes? How might different Greek audiences have reacted?
  3. To what extent does Pericles underestimate the adaptability of land powers? Consider later examples from history.
  4. How does this passage illustrate the concept of 'comparative advantage' in military strategy? What modern parallels exist?