Today's Passage
This passage describes the immediate aftermath of the Theban attack on Plataea in 431 BCE, which marked the beginning of open hostilities in the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
This done, the Plataeans sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the dead to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged things in the city as seemed best to meet the present emergency. The Athenians meanwhile, having had word of the affair sent them immediately after its occurrence, had instantly seized all the Boeotians in Attica, and sent a herald to the Plataeans to forbid their proceeding to extremities with their Theban prisoners without instructions from Athens. The news of the men’s death had of course not arrived; the first messenger having left Plataea just when the Thebans entered it, the second just after their defeat and capture; so there was no later news. Thus the Athenians sent orders in ignorance of the facts; and the herald on his arrival found the men slain. After this the Athenians marched to Plataea and brought in provisions, and left a garrison in the place, also taking away the women and children and such of the men as were least efficient.
After the affair at Plataea, the treaty had been broken by an overt act, and Athens at once prepared for war, as did also Lacedaemon and her allies. They resolved to send embassies to the King and to such other of the barbarian powers as either party could look to for assistance, and tried to ally themselves with the independent states at home. Lacedaemon, in addition to the existing marine, gave orders to the states that had declared for her in Italy and Sicily to build vessels up to a grand total of five hundred, the quota of each city being determined by its size, and also to provide a specified sum of money. Till these were ready they were to remain neutral and to admit single Athenian ships into their harbours. Athens on her part reviewed her existing confederacy, and sent embassies to the places more immediately round Peloponnese—Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus—perceiving that if these could be relied on she could carry the war all round Peloponnese.
Modern Translation
After these events, the Plataeans dispatched a messenger to Athens, returned the Theban dead under a truce, and reorganized their city to best handle the current crisis. The Athenians, who had received word immediately after the incident began, had already arrested all Boeotians residing in Attica and sent a herald instructing the Plataeans not to take extreme measures against their Theban prisoners without guidance from Athens. However, news of the prisoners' execution had not yet reached them; the first messenger had departed Plataea just as the Thebans were entering, and the second left immediately after their defeat and capture, so no subsequent information was available. Consequently, the Athenians issued their orders without knowing the true situation, and their herald arrived to find the prisoners already dead. Following this, the Athenians marched to Plataea, delivered supplies, stationed a garrison there, and evacuated the women, children, and men deemed unfit for military service.
With the Plataean incident constituting a clear violation of the treaty, Athens immediately began preparations for war, as did Sparta and her allies. Both sides decided to send ambassadors to the Persian King and other non-Greek powers from whom they might secure support, while also attempting to forge alliances with independent Greek states. Sparta, beyond her existing fleet, ordered her Italian and Sicilian allies to construct ships totaling five hundred vessels, with each city's contribution based on its size, along with a designated monetary payment. Until these preparations were complete, they were to maintain neutrality and allow only single Athenian ships into their ports. Athens, for her part, assessed her current alliance and dispatched envoys to strategic locations surrounding the Peloponnese—Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus—recognizing that securing these allies would enable her to encircle the Peloponnese militarily.
Historical Context
This passage describes the immediate aftermath of the Theban attack on Plataea in 431 BCE, which marked the beginning of open hostilities in the Peloponnesian War. The Plataeans had killed their Theban prisoners before receiving Athens' instructions to keep them alive, creating a diplomatic complication. The incident shattered the Thirty Years' Peace treaty signed in 445 BCE. Both Athens and Sparta now mobilized for full-scale war, seeking allies both within the Greek world and from foreign powers like Persia. The strategic preparations reveal how both sides understood this would be a prolonged conflict requiring extensive naval resources and control of key geographical positions. Athens particularly focused on securing allies that would allow encirclement of the Peloponnese by sea.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
The Thirty Years' Peace
The treaty signed in 445 BCE between Athens and Sparta that ended the First Peloponnesian War. It guaranteed autonomy to various Greek states and established spheres of influence. The Theban attack on Plataea, an Athenian ally, constituted the first clear violation of this treaty, providing legal justification for renewed warfare.
Learn more →Greek Naval Warfare
Naval power was crucial in ancient Greek warfare, especially for Athens with its empire based on maritime supremacy. The mention of 500 ships shows the massive scale of naval preparation. Triremes were the primary warships, requiring extensive resources and trained crews of about 200 men each.
Learn more →Persian Involvement
Both sides seeking Persian support reveals the pragmatic nature of Greek interstate relations. Despite having united against Persia in the Persian Wars (490-479 BCE), Greek states were willing to court their former enemy for advantage in internal conflicts, showing how the ideological unity against 'barbarians' could be abandoned for strategic gain.
Learn more →Plataea's Strategic Importance
Plataea, though small, held crucial strategic and symbolic importance. Located on the border between Attica and Boeotia, it controlled key routes. As the site of the Greek victory over Persia in 479 BCE, it also held special status. Its alliance with Athens since 519 BCE made it a longstanding thorn in Theban-Boeotian ambitions.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12, Chapter 41-42)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of the Plataean affair and the breakdown of the peace treaty, though with less detail about the diplomatic communications and focusing more on the military preparations.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (Chapter 33)
Plutarch discusses Athens' preparations for war and Pericles' strategy, including the evacuation of the countryside population, which connects to the removal of non-combatants from Plataea mentioned here.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 2, Chapter 2.3)
Though describing later events, Xenophon's account of Sparta's naval building program with allied contributions provides insight into how the system of allied naval quotas mentioned by Thucydides actually functioned in practice.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the communication delay between Athens and Plataea illustrate the challenges of maintaining imperial control in the ancient world? What modern parallels might exist?
- Why would Greek states seek alliance with Persia, their former common enemy? What does this suggest about the nature of ideology versus pragmatism in international relations?
- How does Thucydides' presentation of the treaty violation differ from modern concepts of casus belli? Is the killing of the prisoners or the initial attack the true cause of war?
- What does the naval building program reveal about the expected nature and duration of the coming conflict? How did both sides envision victory?