Today's Passage
This passage appears in Thucydides' 'Archaeology,' his introductory survey of early Greek history that precedes his account of the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The navies, then, of the Hellenes during the period we have traversed were what I have described. All their insignificance did not prevent their being an element of the greatest power to those who cultivated them, alike in revenue and in dominion. They were the means by which the islands were reached and reduced, those of the smallest area falling the easiest prey. Wars by land there were none, none at least by which power was acquired; we have the usual border contests, but of distant expeditions with conquest for object we hear nothing among the Hellenes. There was no union of subject cities round a great state, no spontaneous combination of equals for confederate expeditions; what fighting there was consisted merely of local warfare between rival neighbours. The nearest approach to a coalition took place in the old war between Chalcis and Eretria; this was a quarrel in which the rest of the Hellenic name did to some extent take sides.
Various, too, were the obstacles which the national growth encountered in various localities. The power of the Ionians was advancing with rapid strides, when it came into collision with Persia, under King Cyrus, who, after having dethroned Croesus and overrun everything between the Halys and the sea, stopped not till he had reduced the cities of the coast; the islands being only left to be subdued by Darius and the Phoenician navy.
Again, wherever there were tyrants, their habit of providing simply for themselves, of looking solely to their personal comfort and family aggrandizement, made safety the great aim of their policy, and prevented anything great proceeding from them; though they would each have their affairs with their immediate neighbours. All this is only true of the mother country, for in Sicily they attained to very great power. Thus for a long time everywhere in Hellas do we find causes which make the states alike incapable of combination for great and national ends, or of any vigorous action of their own.
Modern Translation
The naval forces of the Greeks during the period I have outlined were as I have described them. Despite their relative weakness, these fleets represented the greatest source of power for those who developed them, providing both wealth and territorial control. Through naval power, islands were conquered and subjugated, with the smallest territories naturally falling first. Land warfare, by contrast, was virtually non-existent—at least no wars that resulted in the acquisition of power. Apart from typical border skirmishes, we find no evidence among the Greeks of major expeditions aimed at distant conquests. No subject cities united around a dominant state, nor did equal powers spontaneously form alliances for joint military ventures. Combat consisted solely of localized conflicts between neighboring rivals. The closest approximation to a broader alliance occurred during the ancient conflict between Chalcis and Eretria, a dispute that drew the wider Greek world into taking sides to some degree.
Different regions faced various impediments to national development. The Ionians were rapidly expanding their influence when they collided with Persia under King Cyrus. After deposing Croesus and conquering all territory between the Halys River and the coast, Cyrus continued until he had subjugated the coastal cities, leaving the islands to be later conquered by Darius with the Phoenician fleet.
Moreover, in cities ruled by tyrants, their focus on personal security and family advancement—prioritizing their own comfort above all else—made self-preservation their primary political objective. This prevented them from achieving anything significant, limiting their activities to minor conflicts with immediate neighbors. This characterization applies specifically to mainland Greece, as Sicilian tyrants achieved considerable power. Consequently, throughout Greece we observe persistent factors that rendered states incapable of uniting for great national purposes or undertaking ambitious independent action.
Historical Context
This passage appears in Thucydides' 'Archaeology,' his introductory survey of early Greek history that precedes his account of the Peloponnesian War. Writing in the late 5th century BCE, Thucydides analyzes the historical development of Greek power, particularly naval strength, to contextualize the unprecedented scale of the conflict between Athens and Sparta. He examines why earlier Greek states failed to unite or project power effectively, citing the Persian conquest of Ionia (c. 546 BCE under Cyrus), the self-serving nature of tyrants, and the absence of pan-Hellenic cooperation. The reference to the Lelantine War between Chalcis and Eretria (c. 700 BCE) represents one of the earliest recorded Greek conflicts. This analysis serves to highlight the exceptional nature of the Athenian empire and the Peloponnesian War, demonstrating how contemporary Greek power far exceeded anything in the past.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Persian Conquest of Ionia
The subjugation of Greek cities in Asia Minor by Cyrus the Great (c. 546 BCE) marked the beginning of Persian-Greek tensions that would culminate in the Persian Wars. This conquest eliminated a major center of Greek power and wealth, fundamentally altering the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean.
Learn more →Greek Tyranny
Tyrants (tyrannoi) were autocratic rulers who seized power unconstitutionally in many Greek city-states during the 7th-6th centuries BCE. Thucydides criticizes their focus on personal security and dynastic concerns rather than state expansion, contrasting mainland Greek tyrants with more ambitious Sicilian rulers like the Deinomenids.
Learn more →Lelantine War
The conflict between Chalcis and Eretria over the Lelantine Plain (c. 700 BCE) was one of the earliest recorded Greek wars. Its significance lies in drawing other Greek states into opposing alliances, foreshadowing later pan-Hellenic conflicts.
Learn more →Greek Naval Development
Thucydides emphasizes the transformative power of naval forces in Greek history. Maritime strength enabled thalassocracies (sea empires) to control trade routes, exact tribute from islands, and project power across the Mediterranean, establishing a model that Athens would perfect in the 5th century.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Herodotus: Histories (Book 1.26-28)
Herodotus provides a detailed account of Croesus's fall and Cyrus's conquest of Ionia, offering the historical narrative that Thucydides references here in summary form.
Read passage →Aristotle: Politics (Book 5.1310b-1315b)
Aristotle's analysis of tyranny corroborates Thucydides' assessment, explaining how tyrants prioritize self-preservation through bodyguards, elimination of rivals, and prevention of public gatherings.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Solon (Chapters 8-10)
Plutarch discusses the Lelantine War and its impact on archaic Greek politics, providing additional context for the conflict Thucydides mentions as the nearest approach to a coalition war.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Thucydides' emphasis on naval power reflect Athens' contemporary strategic advantages? What might this reveal about his own biases?
- Why does Thucydides argue that tyrants prevented Greek political development? How might this criticism relate to debates about democracy versus autocracy in his own time?
- What does the contrast between mainland Greek and Sicilian tyrants suggest about the relationship between geography and political development?
- How does Thucydides' account of early Greek disunity serve his larger argument about the unprecedented nature of the Peloponnesian War?