Thucydides Daily Reader

Day 96 of 506 Book 2, Chapter 6 February 28, 2026
19% through the History

Today's Passage

This passage occurs early in the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE), during the first Spartan invasion of Attica.

Crawley Translation (1910)

He, meanwhile, seeing anger and infatuation just now in the ascendant, and of his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call either assembly or meeting of the people, fearing the fatal results of a debate inspired by passion and not by prudence. Accordingly he addressed himself to the defence of the city, and kept it as quiet as possible, though he constantly sent out cavalry to prevent raids on the lands near the city from flying parties of the enemy. There was a trifling affair at Phrygia between a squadron of the Athenian horse with the Thessalians and the Boeotian cavalry; in which the former had rather the best of it, until the heavy infantry advanced to the support of the Boeotians, when the Thessalians and Athenians were routed and lost a few men, whose bodies, however, were recovered the same day without a truce. The next day the Peloponnesians set up a trophy. Ancient alliance brought the Thessalians to the aid of Athens; those who came being the Larisaeans, Pharsalians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. The Larisaean commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus, two party leaders in Larisa; the Pharsalian general was Menon; each of the other cities had also its own commander.

In the meantime the Peloponnesians, as the Athenians did not come out to engage them, broke up from Acharnae and ravaged some of the demes between Mount Parnes and Brilessus. While they were in Attica the Athenians sent off the hundred ships which they had been preparing round Peloponnese, with a thousand heavy infantry and four hundred archers on board, under the command of Carcinus, son of Xenotimus, Proteas, son of Epicles, and Socrates, son of Antigenes. This armament weighed anchor and started on its cruise, and the Peloponnesians, after remaining in Attica as long as their provisions lasted, retired through Boeotia by a different road to that by which they had entered. As they passed Oropus they ravaged the territory of Graea, which is held by the Oropians from Athens, and reaching Peloponnese broke up to their respective cities.

After they had retired the Athenians set guards by land and sea at the points at which they intended to have regular stations during the war. They also resolved to set apart a special fund of a thousand talents from the moneys in the Acropolis. This was not to be spent, but the current expenses of the war were to be otherwise provided for. If any one should move or put to the vote a proposition for using the money for any purpose whatever except that of defending the city in the event of the enemy bringing a fleet to make an attack by sea, it should be a capital offence. With this sum of money they also set aside a special fleet of one hundred galleys, the best ships of each year, with their captains. None of these were to be used except with the money and against the same peril, should such peril arise.

Modern Translation

Meanwhile, Pericles recognized that the people were consumed by anger and acting irrationally. Confident in his judgment that they should not engage the enemy outside the walls, he refused to convene either the assembly or any public meeting, fearing that decisions driven by emotion rather than reason would prove catastrophic. Instead, he focused on defending the city and maintaining calm as much as possible, though he regularly dispatched cavalry units to prevent enemy raiding parties from devastating the farmlands near Athens. A minor skirmish occurred at Phrygia between an Athenian cavalry squadron, supported by Thessalians, and the Boeotian cavalry. The Athenians initially held the advantage until Boeotian heavy infantry arrived as reinforcements. The Thessalians and Athenians were then routed and suffered some casualties, though they recovered the bodies that same day without needing to request a truce. The following day, the Peloponnesians erected a trophy to mark their victory. The Thessalians had come to assist Athens due to their ancient alliance; the contingents included forces from Larisa, Pharsalus, Crannon, Pyrasus, Gyrton, and Pherae. The Larisaean commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus, representing opposing political factions in their city; Menon led the Pharsalian forces; and each other city had its own commander.

Meanwhile, since the Athenians refused to meet them in open battle, the Peloponnesians withdrew from Acharnae and plundered several districts between Mount Parnes and Mount Brilessus. While the enemy remained in Attica, the Athenians launched their prepared fleet of one hundred ships to sail around the Peloponnese, carrying a thousand heavy infantry and four hundred archers, commanded by Carcinus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes. This naval force set sail on its mission, and the Peloponnesians, having exhausted their supplies in Attica, retreated through Boeotia by a different route than their approach. Passing by Oropus, they ravaged the territory of Graea, which the Oropians held from Athens, before reaching the Peloponnese and dispersing to their respective cities.

After the enemy withdrawal, the Athenians established guard posts by land and sea at strategic locations they intended to maintain throughout the war. They also voted to reserve a special emergency fund of one thousand talents from the treasury on the Acropolis. This money was not to be touched—the regular war expenses would be met from other sources. Anyone who proposed or brought to vote using this fund for any purpose other than defending the city against a naval attack would face the death penalty. Along with this reserve fund, they also designated a special fleet of one hundred triremes—the finest vessels commissioned each year—with their appointed captains. These ships were to remain unused except in conjunction with the emergency fund and only in response to the same maritime threat, should it materialize.

Historical Context

This passage occurs early in the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE), during the first Spartan invasion of Attica. Pericles, as Athens' leading statesman, implements his defensive strategy: avoiding land battles while relying on naval superiority. The Spartans, led by King Archidamus, have invaded Attica and are ravaging the countryside, hoping to provoke the Athenians into a pitched battle. Pericles refuses to take the bait, knowing Athens cannot match Sparta's heavy infantry. Instead, he keeps the population within the city walls while launching naval raids against the Peloponnese. The passage also reveals Athens' financial preparations for a long war, including the establishment of an emergency reserve fund and fleet. This strategy reflects Pericles' understanding that Athens' strength lay in its navy and financial resources, not in land warfare against Sparta's superior hoplites.

Key Themes

Annotations & References

Periclean Strategy

Pericles' defensive strategy relied on Athens' naval supremacy and financial resources while avoiding land battles with Sparta's superior infantry. This required keeping the rural population within the city walls, causing significant hardship but preserving military strength. The strategy assumed Athens could outlast Sparta in a war of attrition.

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Athenian Democracy and War

The passage illustrates the tension between democratic decision-making and wartime leadership. Pericles deliberately avoids calling the assembly, fearing emotional decisions. This shows how even in democratic Athens, individual leaders could exercise significant control during crises, highlighting the limits of popular sovereignty in warfare.

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Ancient Greek Cavalry

Greek cavalry played a secondary role to heavy infantry (hoplites) in Classical warfare. They were primarily used for scouting, raiding, and protecting flanks. The skirmish at Phrygia demonstrates typical cavalry engagement: initial success followed by retreat when faced with organized infantry support.

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Thessalian Alliance

Thessaly, known for its excellent cavalry due to its plains, maintained traditional ties with Athens. The passage lists specific Thessalian cities and their commanders, showing the decentralized nature of Thessalian politics. Their support provided Athens with much-needed cavalry to counter Boeotian mounted forces.

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Parallel Ancient Sources

Plutarch: Life of Pericles (33-34)

Plutarch describes the same period, emphasizing popular anger at Pericles for allowing their farms to be destroyed while they remained behind walls. He provides personal details about Pericles' leadership during this crisis.

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Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.42)

Diodorus provides a parallel account of the first year of the war, including the Spartan invasion and Athenian naval expedition, though with less detail than Thucydides.

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Aristophanes: Acharnians (Lines 1-39)

This comedy, produced in 425 BCE, reflects Athenian war-weariness and specifically mentions the destruction of Acharnae, providing a contemporary perspective on events Thucydides describes.

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Discussion Questions

  1. Was Pericles justified in preventing democratic deliberation during a crisis? What are the tensions between democratic governance and effective wartime leadership?
  2. How does the establishment of an emergency fund with capital punishment for misuse reflect Athenian anxieties about their democracy's ability to maintain long-term strategic discipline?
  3. What does the minor cavalry skirmish at Phrygia reveal about the limitations of military technology and tactics in Classical Greek warfare?
  4. How might the psychological impact of watching their farms burn have affected Athenian morale and political unity? Was Pericles' strategy sustainable?