Today's Passage
This passage describes the aftermath of Phormio's naval victory over the Peloponnesian fleet in 429 BCE.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet to Cnemus three commissioners—Timocrates, Bradidas, and Lycophron—with orders to prepare to engage again with better fortune, and not to be driven from the sea by a few vessels; for they could not at all account for their discomfiture, the less so as it was their first attempt at sea; and they fancied that it was not that their marine was so inferior, but that there had been misconduct somewhere, not considering the long experience of the Athenians as compared with the little practice which they had had themselves. The commissioners were accordingly sent in anger. As soon as they arrived they set to work with Cnemus to order ships from the different states, and to put those which they already had in fighting order. Meanwhile Phormio sent word to Athens of their preparations and his own victory, and desired as many ships as possible to be speedily sent to him, as he stood in daily expectation of a battle. Twenty were accordingly sent, but instructions were given to their commander to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was proxenus of the Athenians, had persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, promising to procure the reduction of that hostile town; his real wish being to oblige the Polichnitans, neighbours of the Cydonians. He accordingly went with the ships to Crete, and, accompanied by the Polichnitans, laid waste the lands of the Cydonians; and, what with adverse winds and stress of weather wasted no little time there.
While the Athenians were thus detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians in Cyllene got ready for battle, and coasted along to Panormus in Achaea, where their land army had come to support them. Phormio also coasted along to Molycrian Rhium, and anchored outside it with twenty ships, the same as he had fought with before. This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians. The other, in Peloponnese, lies opposite to it; the sea between them is about three-quarters of a mile broad, and forms the mouth of the Crissaean gulf. At this, the Achaean Rhium, not far off Panormus, where their army lay, the Peloponnesians now cast anchor with seventy-seven ships, when they saw the Athenians do so. For six or seven days they remained opposite each other, practising and preparing for the battle; the one resolved not to sail out of the Rhia into the open sea, for fear of the disaster which had already happened to them, the other not to sail into the straits, thinking it advantageous to the enemy, to fight in the narrows. At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the Peloponnesian commanders, being desirous of bringing on a battle as soon as possible, before reinforcements should arrive from Athens, and noticing that the men were most of them cowed by the previous defeat and out of heart for the business, first called them together and encouraged them as follows:
Modern Translation
The Spartans now dispatched three commissioners to their fleet under Cnemus—Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron—with instructions to prepare for another engagement with better results, and not to allow themselves to be driven from the sea by a handful of ships. They simply could not understand their defeat, especially since this was their first serious naval venture. They suspected not that their fleet was inferior, but that there had been some failure of leadership, failing to appreciate the Athenians' extensive naval experience compared to their own limited practice. The commissioners were sent in a state of indignation. Upon arrival, they immediately worked with Cnemus to requisition ships from the allied states and to prepare their existing vessels for combat. Meanwhile, Phormio sent news to Athens about the enemy's preparations and his own victory, requesting as many ships as possible be sent urgently, since he expected battle any day. Twenty ships were dispatched in response, but their commander received orders to sail first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan from Gortys who served as proxenos for Athens, had convinced them to attack Cydonia, promising to secure that hostile city's surrender; though his true motive was to help the Polichnitans, who were neighbors of the Cydonians. The commander therefore sailed to Crete and, joining the Polichnitans, ravaged Cydonian territory; between contrary winds and bad weather, he wasted considerable time there.
While the Athenians were delayed in Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene prepared for battle and sailed along the coast to Panormus in Achaea, where their land forces had assembled to support them. Phormio likewise sailed to Molycrian Rhium and anchored outside with his twenty ships—the same squadron he had previously commanded in battle. This Rhium was allied with Athens. The other Rhium, on the Peloponnesian side, faces it across the water; the strait between them spans roughly three-quarters of a mile and forms the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth. At this Achaean Rhium, near Panormus where their army was stationed, the Peloponnesians anchored with seventy-seven ships after seeing the Athenians take position. For six or seven days the fleets faced each other, drilling and preparing for combat; the Peloponnesians determined not to sail beyond the Rhia into open water, remembering their previous disaster, while the Athenians refused to enter the narrows, believing confined waters would favor their enemies. Finally, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, eager to engage before Athenian reinforcements arrived and observing that their men were demoralized by their earlier defeat and lacked enthusiasm for fighting, first assembled them and delivered this encouragement:
Historical Context
This passage describes the aftermath of Phormio's naval victory over the Peloponnesian fleet in 429 BCE. The Spartans, humiliated by their defeat, send commissioners including the famous Brasidas to investigate and prepare for a rematch. The strategic situation centers on control of the Gulf of Corinth, with both fleets positioning themselves at the narrow entrance between the two promontories called Rhium. Meanwhile, Athens diverts reinforcements to Crete for a side operation, leaving Phormio's twenty ships to face seventy-seven Peloponnesian vessels. This episode illustrates key themes of the war: Spartan inexperience at sea versus Athenian naval supremacy, the importance of morale in warfare, and how secondary operations could affect main strategic objectives. The passage sets up one of the most dramatic naval battles in ancient history, where tactical skill would prove more decisive than numerical superiority.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Ancient Naval Warfare
Greek naval battles typically involved triremes—warships powered by three banks of oars. Success depended on ramming enemy vessels or breaking their oars. The confined waters near Rhium would limit maneuverability, potentially neutralizing Athenian advantages in seamanship and favoring the numerically superior but less skilled Peloponnesian fleet.
Learn more →Proxenos System
A proxenos was a citizen who represented another city-state's interests in his own polis, similar to a modern consul. Nicias of Gortys served Athens' interests in Crete, demonstrating how personal relationships and local politics influenced military operations throughout the Greek world.
Learn more →Brasidas
One of Sparta's most innovative commanders, Brasidas would later become famous for his campaigns in northern Greece. His appearance here as a commissioner shows his early involvement in adapting Spartan strategy to meet Athenian naval power, foreshadowing his later unconventional approaches to warfare.
Learn more →Geography of the Gulf of Corinth
The narrow entrance between Rhium and Antirrhium (modern Rio-Antirrio) controlled access to the Gulf of Corinth. This strategic chokepoint allowed smaller forces to contest naval supremacy and remained militarily significant throughout antiquity, demonstrating the enduring importance of geographic features in warfare.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.48)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of Phormio's naval victories, emphasizing Athenian tactical superiority and the psychological impact on Peloponnesian morale, though with less detail than Thucydides.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (36)
While focusing on Pericles, Plutarch discusses Athenian naval supremacy and strategy during this period, providing context for understanding why Athens could afford to divert ships to secondary operations like Crete.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.35)
Though describing later events, Xenophon's account of naval battles in confined waters offers insights into the tactical considerations that made both sides hesitant to engage in the narrows at Rhium.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Thucydides portray the different responses to military defeat between the Spartans (seeking blame) and their actual problem (lack of experience)? What does this reveal about self-perception versus reality in warfare?
- Why might Athens have diverted twenty ships to a secondary operation in Crete when Phormio was facing a fleet nearly four times his size? What does this suggest about Athenian confidence or strategic priorities?
- Examine the role of geography in this passage. How do the physical constraints of the Rhium straits influence both sides' tactical decisions?
- What does the mention of the troops being 'cowed by the previous defeat and out of heart' suggest about the psychological dimensions of ancient warfare? How might this compare to modern military morale?