Today's Passage
This passage describes the second phase of the naval battle off Naupactus in 429 BCE between the Athenian admiral Phormio and a larger Peloponnesian fleet.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Such was the exhortation of Phormio. The Peloponnesians finding that the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows, in order to lead them in whether they wished it or not, put out at dawn, and forming four abreast, sailed inside the gulf in the direction of their own country, the right wing leading as they had lain at anchor. In this wing were placed twenty of their best sailers; so that in the event of Phormio thinking that their object was Naupactus, and coasting along thither to save the place, the Athenians might not be able to escape their onset by getting outside their wing, but might be cut off by the vessels in question. As they expected, Phormio, in alarm for the place at that moment emptied of its garrison, as soon as he saw them put out, reluctantly and hurriedly embarked and sailed along shore; the Messenian land forces moving along also to support him. The Peloponnesians seeing him coasting along with his ships in single file, and by this inside the gulf and close inshore as they so much wished, at one signal tacked suddenly and bore down in line at their best speed on the Athenians, hoping to cut off the whole squadron. The eleven leading vessels, however, escaped the Peloponnesian wing and its sudden movement, and reached the more open water; but the rest were overtaken as they tried to run through, driven ashore and disabled; such of the crews being slain as had not swum out of them. Some of the ships the Peloponnesians lashed to their own, and towed off empty; one they took with the men in it; others were just being towed off, when they were saved by the Messenians dashing into the sea with their armour and fighting from the decks that they had boarded.
Thus far victory was with the Peloponnesians, and the Athenian fleet destroyed; the twenty ships in the right wing being meanwhile in chase of the eleven Athenian vessels that had escaped their sudden movement and reached the more open water. These, with the exception of one ship, all outsailed them and got safe into Naupactus, and forming close inshore opposite the temple of Apollo, with their prows facing the enemy, prepared to defend themselves in case the Peloponnesians should sail inshore against them. After a while the Peloponnesians came up, chanting the paean for their victory as they sailed on; the single Athenian ship remaining being chased by a Leucadian far ahead of the rest. But there happened to be a merchantman lying at anchor in the roadstead, which the Athenian ship found time to sail round, and struck the Leucadian in chase amidships and sank her. An exploit so sudden and unexpected produced a panic among the Peloponnesians; and having fallen out of order in the excitement of victory, some of them dropped their oars and stopped their way in order to let the main body come up—an unsafe thing to do considering how near they were to the enemy’s prows; while others ran aground in the shallows, in their ignorance of the localities.
Modern Translation
This was how Phormio rallied his men. When the Peloponnesians realized the Athenians would not enter the gulf and narrows—where they hoped to trap them—they set sail at dawn. Arranged four ships abreast, they headed into the gulf toward their own territory, with their right wing in the lead, maintaining the same formation they had held at anchor. They positioned twenty of their fastest ships on this wing, calculating that if Phormio believed they were targeting Naupactus and sailed along the coast to defend it, these swift vessels could prevent the Athenians from escaping by outflanking them and cutting off their retreat. As anticipated, Phormio grew alarmed for Naupactus, which currently lacked defenders. Seeing the enemy fleet in motion, he reluctantly ordered a hasty embarkation and sailed along the coastline, accompanied by Messenian infantry moving parallel on shore. When the Peloponnesians observed him sailing in single file close to shore within the gulf—exactly where they wanted him—they executed a synchronized turn at a prearranged signal and charged at full speed toward the Athenians, expecting to annihilate the entire squadron. The eleven ships in the Athenian vanguard, however, evaded the Peloponnesian wing's sudden maneuver and reached open water. The remaining vessels were caught as they attempted to escape, driven onto the beach and wrecked, their crews killed unless they managed to swim to safety. The Peloponnesians secured some abandoned ships with cables and began towing them away; one they captured with its crew still aboard. Others were on the verge of being taken when Messenian soldiers plunged into the sea in full armor, boarded the vessels, and fought from their decks to save them. At this point, the Peloponnesians held the advantage, having shattered the Athenian fleet. Meanwhile, their twenty ships from the right wing pursued the eleven Athenian vessels that had broken through to open water. All but one of these ships outran their pursuers and reached safety at Naupactus, where they formed a defensive line near shore opposite Apollo's temple, their prows facing seaward, ready to repel any assault. Soon the Peloponnesians arrived, singing their victory song as they approached. A single Leucadian ship had pulled far ahead of the others, chasing the one remaining Athenian vessel. Fortunately, a merchant ship happened to be anchored in the harbor. The fleeing Athenian ship managed to circle around it and rammed the pursuing Leucadian amidships, sinking her. This sudden reversal stunned the Peloponnesians. In their triumphant disorder, some crews stopped rowing to wait for stragglers—a dangerous mistake given their proximity to the enemy. Others, unfamiliar with the local waters, ran aground on the shallows.
Historical Context
This passage describes the second phase of the naval battle off Naupactus in 429 BCE between the Athenian admiral Phormio and a larger Peloponnesian fleet. After Phormio's earlier victory, the Peloponnesians attempted to force a battle by threatening Naupactus, an important Athenian ally. The engagement showcases both Peloponnesian tactical planning and the dangers of overconfidence in naval warfare. Despite initial success in catching most of the Athenian fleet, the Peloponnesians' discipline collapsed after a single ship was unexpectedly sunk. This battle demonstrates the superiority of Athenian naval skill and the psychological dynamics of ancient warfare, where momentum could shift dramatically. The engagement reinforced Athenian naval dominance in the early war years and secured their position in the Corinthian Gulf.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Ancient Naval Tactics
The Peloponnesian formation of 'four abreast' contrasts with the Athenian single file, showing different tactical approaches. The Peloponnesians sought to use their numerical superiority in close combat, while the Athenians relied on maneuverability and seamanship in open water.
Learn more →Naupactus
Modern Lepanto, this strategic port controlled access to the Corinthian Gulf. Athens had settled Messenian exiles there after the helot revolt, making it a crucial ally and naval base for projecting power into western Greece.
Learn more →The Paean
A ritual song of triumph or supplication to Apollo, commonly sung by Greek forces before or after battle. Its use here by the Peloponnesians demonstrates the religious dimension of ancient warfare and perhaps premature celebration.
Learn more →Messenian Exiles
Former helots from Messenia who had rebelled against Sparta and were resettled by Athens at Naupactus. Their fierce loyalty to Athens and hatred of Sparta made them valuable allies, as shown by their heroic intervention here.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.48)
Diodorus provides a briefer account of Phormio's naval victories, emphasizing Athenian naval superiority and the psychological impact of their tactics on Peloponnesian morale.
Read passage →Plutarch: Moralia (De Gloria Atheniensium 345c-d)
Plutarch mentions Phormio's victories as examples of Athenian military excellence, particularly praising the admiral's ability to overcome numerical disadvantages through superior tactics.
Read passage →Polyaenus: Strategems (3.4.2)
Polyaenus records Phormio's naval tactics as exemplary strategems, focusing on how the Athenian commander used geography and enemy overconfidence to achieve victory despite being outnumbered.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does this passage illustrate the relationship between tactical planning and battlefield psychology? Consider how the Peloponnesians' initial success turned to panic.
- What role does geography play in ancient naval warfare based on this account? How do both commanders attempt to use the coastline and confined waters to their advantage?
- How does Thucydides portray the element of chance (tyche) in warfare through the merchant vessel incident? Is this consistent with his overall historical methodology?
- What does the Messenian intervention reveal about the nature of alliances and identity in the Greek world? Consider their motivations for such risky action.