Today's Passage
This passage presents Phormio's pre-battle speech to his Athenian naval forces at Rhium in 429 BCE, during the second year of the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“I see, my men, that you are frightened by the number of the enemy, and I have accordingly called you together, not liking you to be afraid of what is not really terrible. In the first place, the Peloponnesians, already defeated, and not even themselves thinking that they are a match for us, have not ventured to meet us on equal terms, but have equipped this multitude of ships against us. Next, as to that upon which they most rely, the courage which they suppose constitutional to them, their confidence here only arises from the success which their experience in land service usually gives them, and which they fancy will do the same for them at sea. But this advantage will in all justice belong to us on this element, if to them on that; as they are not superior to us in courage, but we are each of us more confident, according to our experience in our particular department. Besides, as the Lacedaemonians use their supremacy over their allies to promote their own glory, they are most of them being brought into danger against their will, or they would never, after such a decided defeat, have ventured upon a fresh engagement. You need not, therefore, be afraid of their dash. You, on the contrary, inspire a much greater and better founded alarm, both because of your late victory and also of their belief that we should not face them unless about to do something worthy of a success so signal. An adversary numerically superior, like the one before us, comes into action trusting more to strength than to resolution; while he who voluntarily confronts tremendous odds must have very great internal resources to draw upon. For these reasons the Peloponnesians fear our irrational audacity more than they would ever have done a more commensurate preparation. Besides, many armaments have before now succumbed to an inferior through want of skill or sometimes of courage; neither of which defects certainly are ours. As to the battle, it shall not be, if I can help it, in the strait, nor will I sail in there at all; seeing that in a contest between a number of clumsily managed vessels and a small, fast, well-handled squadron, want of sea room is an undoubted disadvantage. One cannot run down an enemy properly without having a sight of him a good way off, nor can one retire at need when pressed; one can neither break the line nor return upon his rear, the proper tactics for a fast sailer; but the naval action necessarily becomes a land one, in which numbers must decide the matter. For all this I will provide as far as can be. Do you stay at your posts by your ships, and be sharp at catching the word of command, the more so as we are observing one another from so short a distance; and in action think order and silence all-important—qualities useful in war generally, and in naval engagements in particular; and behave before the enemy in a manner worthy of your past exploits. The issues you will fight for are great—to destroy the naval hopes of the Peloponnesians or to bring nearer to the Athenians their fears for the sea. And I may once more remind you that you have defeated most of them already; and beaten men do not face a danger twice with the same determination.”
Modern Translation
I can see, men, that the enemy's numbers have frightened you, and that's why I've called this assembly—I won't have you intimidated by something that isn't truly fearsome. First, consider this: the Peloponnesians have already been defeated. They don't even believe they're our equals anymore, which is why they haven't dared to face us in a fair fight. Instead, they've assembled this massive fleet against us. Second, regarding what they're counting on most—that supposed natural courage of theirs—their confidence comes solely from their usual success in land battles, and they imagine this will translate to naval warfare. But by rights, this advantage belongs to us at sea, just as theirs does on land. They're not braver than we are; rather, each side draws confidence from experience in its own domain. Moreover, the Spartans exploit their leadership over their allies to enhance their own reputation, forcing most of them into this dangerous venture against their will—otherwise they'd never risk another battle after such a crushing defeat. So don't fear their boldness. In fact, you inspire far greater and more justified terror in them, both because of your recent victory and because they believe we wouldn't face them unless we were planning something worthy of such a spectacular success. When an enemy has numerical superiority, like these Peloponnesians, they enter battle trusting in strength rather than determination. But those who willingly face overwhelming odds must possess extraordinary inner resources. That's why the Peloponnesians fear our seemingly irrational daring more than they would fear a more conventional force. Remember too that many fleets have fallen to smaller ones through lack of skill or courage—and we certainly suffer from neither deficiency. As for the battle itself, I'll make sure it doesn't happen in the straits—I won't sail in there at all. In a fight between numerous poorly-handled ships and a small, swift, expertly-managed squadron, confined waters are clearly disadvantageous. You can't properly ram an enemy without spotting him from far off, nor can you retreat when hard-pressed. You can't break through their line or circle back on their rear—the standard tactics for fast ships. Instead, the naval battle becomes a land battle, where numbers alone determine the outcome. I'll take every precaution against this. Your job is to stay at your posts by your ships and respond instantly to commands—especially important since we're watching each other from such close quarters. In battle, prioritize discipline and silence above all—these qualities are valuable in any warfare but especially crucial in naval combat. Face the enemy in a manner worthy of your previous victories. The stakes are enormous: either destroy the Peloponnesians' naval ambitions or bring Athens's maritime fears closer to reality. Let me remind you once more: you've already defeated most of these men, and those who've been beaten once don't face the same danger with equal resolve a second time.
Historical Context
This passage presents Phormio's pre-battle speech to his Athenian naval forces at Rhium in 429 BCE, during the second year of the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians, though vastly outnumbered (20 ships versus 77 Peloponnesian vessels), had recently won a stunning victory at Patrae. Phormio, Athens's most brilliant naval commander, addresses his men's understandable anxiety about facing such overwhelming odds. The speech exemplifies Athenian naval confidence and tactical sophistication—Phormio emphasizes superior seamanship, experience, and morale over mere numbers. This encounter represents a critical moment when Athens's naval supremacy, essential to its empire and survival, faced a serious challenge from a Peloponnesian fleet determined to break Athenian control of the sea lanes.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Athenian Naval Supremacy
Athens's dominance at sea was fundamental to its empire, enabling control of trade routes, tribute collection, and rapid deployment of forces. This superiority stemmed from extensive maritime experience, superior ship design (especially the trireme), and highly skilled crews of citizen rowers.
Learn more →Spartan Hegemony
Phormio references how Sparta used its leadership position to compel allied participation. The Peloponnesian League operated under Spartan direction, with allies often reluctantly providing ships and men for campaigns that primarily served Spartan interests rather than their own.
Learn more →Ancient Naval Tactics
Phormio outlines key trireme tactics: the diekplous (sailing through enemy lines) and periplous (outflanking maneuvers). These required open water and expert seamanship. In confined spaces, naval battles devolved into boarding actions where numbers mattered more than skill.
Learn more →Battle of Rhium
This speech precedes the Battle of Rhium (429 BCE), where Phormio's 20 ships would face 77 Peloponnesian vessels. Despite overwhelming odds, the Athenians would win through superior tactics and seamanship, validating Phormio's confidence in quality over quantity.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Pericles (Chapter 11)
Plutarch describes how Pericles established Athenian naval supremacy through continuous training and maintaining professional crews, explaining the expertise Phormio's men possessed.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 1.6.31-34)
Xenophon recounts the later Spartan development of naval power, showing how they eventually learned from Athenian tactics to challenge Athens at sea, validating Phormio's assessment of their initial inexperience.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.48)
Diodorus provides an alternative account of Phormio's naval victories, emphasizing the psychological impact of Athenian naval reputation on their enemies, supporting Phormio's claims about inspiring fear.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Phormio use psychological analysis of both his own men and the enemy to build confidence? What does this reveal about ancient Greek understanding of morale in warfare?
- Examine Phormio's distinction between fighting in open water versus confined spaces. How does this reflect the relationship between technology, tactics, and geography in ancient warfare?
- What does Phormio's comment about Spartan allies being forced to fight reveal about the nature of hegemonic alliances in ancient Greece? How might this compare to modern military coalitions?
- How does Phormio's speech balance rational tactical analysis with appeals to emotion and past glory? What does this suggest about effective military leadership?