Today's Passage
This passage occurs early in the Peloponnesian War (428 BCE), following Mytilene's revolt from the Athenian empire.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Such were the words of the Mitylenians. After hearing them out, the Lacedaemonians and confederates granted what they urged, and took the Lesbians into alliance, and deciding in favour of the invasion of Attica, told the allies present to march as quickly as possible to the Isthmus with two-thirds of their forces; and arriving there first themselves, got ready hauling machines to carry their ships across from Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens, in order to make their attack by sea and land at once. However, the zeal which they displayed was not imitated by the rest of the confederates, who came in but slowly, being engaged in harvesting their corn and sick of making expeditions.
Meanwhile the Athenians, aware that the preparations of the enemy were due to his conviction of their weakness, and wishing to show him that he was mistaken, and that they were able, without moving the Lesbian fleet, to repel with ease that with which they were menaced from Peloponnese, manned a hundred ships by embarking the citizens of Athens, except the knights and Pentacosiomedimni, and the resident aliens; and putting out to the Isthmus, displayed their power, and made descents upon Peloponnese wherever they pleased. A disappointment so signal made the Lacedaemonians think that the Lesbians had not spoken the truth; and embarrassed by the non-appearance of the confederates, coupled with the news that the thirty ships round Peloponnese were ravaging the lands near Sparta, they went back home. Afterwards, however, they got ready a fleet to send to Lesbos, and ordering a total of forty ships from the different cities in the league, appointed Alcidas to command the expedition in his capacity of high admiral. Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships, upon seeing the Lacedaemonians go home, went home likewise.
If, at the time that this fleet was at sea, Athens had almost the largest number of first-rate ships in commission that she ever possessed at any one moment, she had as many or even more when the war began. At that time one hundred guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis; a hundred more were cruising round Peloponnese, besides those employed at Potidæa and in other places; making a grand total of two hundred and fifty vessels employed on active service in a single summer. It was this, with Potidæa, that most exhausted her revenues—Potidæa being blockaded by a force of heavy infantry (each drawing two drachmae a day, one for himself and another for his servant), which amounted to three thousand at first, and was kept at this number down to the end of the siege; besides sixteen hundred with Phormio who went away before it was over; and the ships being all paid at the same rate. In this way her money was wasted at first; and this was the largest number of ships ever manned by her.
Modern Translation
This was the substance of the Mytilenean appeal. After listening to their arguments, the Spartans and their allies accepted their proposal and formally admitted the Lesbians into their alliance. They resolved to invade Attica and instructed the allies present to mobilize two-thirds of their forces and march immediately to the Isthmus. The Spartans themselves arrived first and began preparing ship-hauling equipment to transport their vessels overland from Corinth to the Athenian side of the sea, planning a coordinated assault by both land and sea. Yet despite Spartan enthusiasm, the other allies responded sluggishly, preoccupied with their harvest and weary of constant military campaigns.
The Athenians, recognizing that these enemy preparations stemmed from a perception of Athenian weakness, determined to demonstrate their true strength. Without even recalling their fleet from Lesbos, they manned one hundred ships with Athenian citizens—excluding only the cavalry and the wealthiest property class, the Pentacosiomedimni—along with resident foreigners. Sailing to the Isthmus, they made an impressive display of naval power and conducted raids along the Peloponnesian coast at will. This unexpected show of force convinced the Spartans that the Mytileneans had misrepresented Athens' weakness. Discouraged by this revelation and their allies' failure to appear, combined with reports that the thirty Athenian ships circumnavigating the Peloponnese were devastating territories near Sparta itself, they withdrew. Subsequently, however, they prepared a fleet for Lesbos, requisitioning forty ships from various allied cities and appointing Alcidas as admiral-in-chief. The Athenians, observing the Spartan withdrawal, likewise returned home with their hundred ships.
While this fleet was deployed, Athens had nearly the greatest number of first-class warships in active service at any point in her history—though the war's opening saw comparable or even greater numbers. Initially, one hundred ships guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis; another hundred patrolled around the Peloponnese, in addition to those stationed at Potidaea and elsewhere—totaling two hundred and fifty vessels operational in a single campaign season. This naval deployment, combined with the Potidaea operation, severely strained Athenian finances. The Potidaea blockade required heavy infantry forces (each soldier receiving two drachmas daily—one for himself, one for his attendant), maintaining three thousand troops initially and throughout the siege, plus sixteen hundred under Phormio who departed before its conclusion. With all ships receiving identical pay rates, Athens' treasury was rapidly depleted during this period, which marked the peak of her naval mobilization.
Historical Context
This passage occurs early in the Peloponnesian War (428 BCE), following Mytilene's revolt from the Athenian empire. The Mytileneans have sent envoys to Sparta seeking military support, arguing that Athens is weakened and vulnerable. The passage reveals the complex dynamics of Greek alliance systems: Sparta's initial enthusiasm but organizational difficulties in mobilizing the Peloponnesian League, contrasted with Athens' impressive ability to project naval power despite being engaged on multiple fronts. Thucydides uses this episode to illustrate both Athenian resilience and the financial strain of maintaining imperial dominance, foreshadowing the economic exhaustion that would eventually contribute to Athens' defeat.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Pentacosiomedimni
The wealthiest class in Solon's property-based classification of Athenian citizens, those producing 500 measures of agricultural produce annually. Their exemption from rowing duty reflects both their obligation to serve as cavalry or hoplites and the democratic principle that naval service was primarily the duty of lower classes.
Learn more →Ship-hauling (Diolkos)
The Spartans planned to use the diolkos, a paved trackway across the Isthmus of Corinth, to transport ships between the Corinthian and Saronic Gulfs. This ancient engineering feat allowed vessels to avoid the dangerous circumnavigation of the Peloponnese.
Learn more →Athenian Naval Finance
The passage reveals the enormous cost of maintaining Athens' thalassocracy. At two drachmas per day per soldier (plus attendants), and with naval crews receiving similar wages, Athens was spending approximately 5-6 talents daily on the Potidaea operation alone.
Learn more →Alcidas
The Spartan navarch (admiral) appointed to command the relief expedition to Lesbos. His subsequent cautious and ineffective leadership would become emblematic of Sparta's difficulties in naval warfare, contrasting sharply with aggressive Athenian naval commanders like Phormio.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Aristotle: Constitution of Athens (24.3)
Discusses Athens' naval supremacy and its connection to democratic power, noting how the poor citizens who rowed the ships gained political influence through their essential military service.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Pericles (11.4)
Describes Athens' naval expenditures and Pericles' policy of maintaining large fleets, providing context for the financial strain Thucydides mentions in this passage.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.6.2-5)
Details later Athenian naval operations and financial difficulties, showing how the economic pressures described here eventually culminated in Athens' inability to maintain its fleet.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does this passage illustrate the different strategic capabilities and limitations of Athens (naval power) versus Sparta (land power with reluctant allies)?
- What does the Athenian response reveal about the psychology of power projection and deterrence in interstate relations?
- How does Thucydides use financial details to make a larger point about the sustainability of imperial power?
- What does the allies' reluctance to leave their harvests suggest about the tensions between local interests and alliance obligations in the ancient Greek world?