Today's Passage
This passage describes the critical moment in 427 BCE when Mytilene's revolt against Athens collapsed.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Towards the close of the same winter, Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian, was sent out in a galley from Lacedaemon to Mitylene. Going by sea to Pyrrha, and from thence overland, he passed along the bed of a torrent, where the line of circumvallation was passable, and thus entering unperceived into Mitylene told the magistrates that Attica would certainly be invaded, and the forty ships destined to relieve them arrive, and that he had been sent on to announce this and to superintend matters generally. The Mitylenians upon this took courage, and laid aside the idea of treating with the Athenians; and now this winter ended, and with it ended the fourth year of the war of which Thucydides was the historian.
The next summer the Peloponnesians sent off the forty-two ships for Mitylene, under Alcidas, their high admiral, and themselves and their allies invaded Attica, their object being to distract the Athenians by a double movement, and thus to make it less easy for them to act against the fleet sailing to Mitylene. The commander in this invasion was Cleomenes, in the place of King Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, his nephew, who was still a minor. Not content with laying waste whatever had shot up in the parts which they had before devastated, the invaders now extended their ravages to lands passed over in their previous incursions; so that this invasion was more severely felt by the Athenians than any except the second; the enemy staying on and on until they had overrun most of the country, in the expectation of hearing from Lesbos of something having been achieved by their fleet, which they thought must now have got over. However, as they did not obtain any of the results expected, and their provisions began to run short, they retreated and dispersed to their different cities.
In the meantime the Mitylenians, finding their provisions failing, while the fleet from Peloponnese was loitering on the way instead of appearing at Mitylene, were compelled to come to terms with the Athenians in the following manner. Salaethus having himself ceased to expect the fleet to arrive, now armed the commons with heavy armour, which they had not before possessed, with the intention of making a sortie against the Athenians. The commons, however, no sooner found themselves possessed of arms than they refused any longer to obey their officers; and forming in knots together, told the authorities to bring out in public the provisions and divide them amongst them all, or they would themselves come to terms with the Athenians and deliver up the city.
Modern Translation
As that same winter drew to a close, the Spartans dispatched Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian officer, by ship to Mytilene. He sailed to Pyrrha, then proceeded overland, following a dry streambed where the Athenian siege lines could be crossed. Slipping undetected into Mytilene, he informed the city magistrates that the Spartans would definitely invade Attica and that forty ships were on their way to relieve them. He had been sent ahead to announce this news and to oversee preparations. This message reinvigorated the Mytileneans, who abandoned any thought of negotiating with Athens. Thus ended the winter, and with it the fourth year of the war that Thucydides recorded.
When summer arrived, the Peloponnesians dispatched their promised fleet of forty-two ships to Mytilene under Admiral Alcidas, while simultaneously launching another invasion of Attica with their allies. Their strategy was to divide Athenian attention with this two-pronged assault, making it harder for Athens to respond to the fleet bound for Mytilene. The invasion force was commanded by Cleomenes, acting as regent for King Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, who was still too young to rule. Not satisfied with devastating areas they had previously attacked, the invaders now ravaged territories they had spared before. This made the current invasion more painful for the Athenians than any since the second year of the war. The Peloponnesians lingered, devastating much of the countryside while waiting for news that their fleet had accomplished something at Lesbos. When no such news arrived and their supplies began running low, they withdrew and returned to their respective cities.
Meanwhile in Mytilene, with provisions dwindling and the Peloponnesian fleet nowhere in sight despite expectations, the city was forced to negotiate with Athens. The situation developed as follows: Salaethus, having lost hope that the fleet would arrive, decided to arm the common people with heavy armor—something they had never possessed before—intending to lead them in a desperate assault against the Athenian besiegers. However, once the common citizens were armed, they refused to follow orders. Gathering in groups, they confronted the authorities with an ultimatum: either distribute all remaining food supplies publicly and equally, or they would negotiate directly with the Athenians and surrender the city themselves.
Historical Context
This passage describes the critical moment in 427 BCE when Mytilene's revolt against Athens collapsed. The city had rebelled in 428, hoping for Spartan support, but was now under siege. Despite Spartan promises and the arrival of the agent Salaethus, help failed to materialize. The passage highlights a classic pattern in the Peloponnesian War: Sparta's inability to effectively coordinate land and naval operations to support allies overseas. The arming of the Mytilenean commons backfired spectacularly when class tensions erupted—the hungry lower classes, once armed, turned against their oligarchic leaders rather than the Athenian besiegers. This internal revolution forced Mytilene's surrender and would lead to one of the war's most famous debates in Athens about how to punish the rebellious city.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Spartan Naval Inadequacy
Throughout the Peloponnesian War, Sparta struggled with naval operations despite being the premier land power. Their fleet's delay here exemplifies their strategic weakness at sea, which would persist until Persian funding later in the war enabled them to build an effective navy.
Learn more →Greek Siege Warfare
The 'circumvallation' mentioned refers to the Athenian siege works surrounding Mytilene. Greek sieges typically involved blockading walls rather than assault, aiming to starve cities into submission. Salaethus's ability to slip through shows these lines weren't always complete.
Learn more →Class Conflict in Greek Cities
The arming of the commons (demos) reveals deep social divisions in Greek poleis. Mytilene's oligarchs desperately armed the lower classes, but this backfired when economic grievances overcame patriotic unity, demonstrating how external wars often triggered internal revolutions.
Learn more →Athenian Strategy
Athens's ability to maintain a siege while defending Attica shows their strategic advantage. Their naval supremacy allowed them to project power across the Aegean while their Long Walls protected the city even when the countryside was ravaged.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Aristotle: Constitution of Athens (27.3-4)
Aristotle discusses how the Mytilenean revolt strained Athenian finances and led to the first direct tax on citizens, showing the revolt's impact on Athenian domestic politics.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.55-56)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of the Mytilenean revolt, including details about the subsequent Athenian debate over punishment, though his chronology sometimes differs from Thucydides.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.6.24-38)
Xenophon describes a similar situation at Byzantium in 408 BCE, where Spartan failure to supply their garrison led to the city's betrayal, showing recurring patterns in Spartan alliance management.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the arming of the Mytilenean commons illustrate the relationship between military service and political power in Greek city-states?
- What does this episode reveal about the challenges of maintaining alliances across long distances in the ancient world?
- Why might Spartan naval expeditions consistently fail during this period of the war? Consider both practical and cultural factors.
- How does class conflict within Mytilene complicate our understanding of Greek identity and loyalty during wartime?