Today's Passage
This passage describes the surrender of Mytilene to Athens in 427 BCE during the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The government, aware of their inability to prevent this, and of the danger they would be in, if left out of the capitulation, publicly agreed with Paches and the army to surrender Mitylene at discretion and to admit the troops into the town; upon the understanding that the Mitylenians should be allowed to send an embassy to Athens to plead their cause, and that Paches should not imprison, make slaves of, or put to death any of the citizens until its return. Such were the terms of the capitulation; in spite of which the chief authors of the negotiation with Lacedaemon were so completely overcome by terror when the army entered that they went and seated themselves by the altars, from which they were raised up by Paches under promise that he would do them no wrong, and lodged by him in Tenedos, until he should learn the pleasure of the Athenians concerning them. Paches also sent some galleys and seized Antissa, and took such other military measures as he thought advisable.
Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the forty ships, who ought to have made all haste to relieve Mitylene, lost time in coming round Peloponnese itself, and proceeding leisurely on the remainder of the voyage, made Delos without having been seen by the Athenians at Athens, and from thence arriving at Icarus and Myconus, there first heard of the fall of Mitylene. Wishing to know the truth, they put into Embatum, in the Erythraeid, about seven days after the capture of the town. Here they learned the truth, and began to consider what they were to do; and Teutiaplus, an Elean, addressed them as follows:
“Alcidas and Peloponnesians who share with me the command of this armament, my advice is to sail just as we are to Mitylene, before we have been heard of. We may expect to find the Athenians as much off their guard as men generally are who have just taken a city: this will certainly be so by sea, where they have no idea of any enemy attacking them, and where our strength, as it happens, mainly lies; while even their land forces are probably scattered about the houses in the carelessness of victory. If therefore we were to fall upon them suddenly and in the night, I have hopes, with the help of the well-wishers that we may have left inside the town, that we shall become masters of the place. Let us not shrink from the risk, but let us remember that this is just the occasion for one of the baseless panics common in war: and that to be able to guard against these in one’s own case, and to detect the moment when an attack will find an enemy at this disadvantage, is what makes a successful general.”
Modern Translation
The government, recognizing their powerlessness to stop this and the peril they faced if excluded from the surrender terms, publicly negotiated with Paches and his forces to hand over Mytilene unconditionally and allow the troops to enter the city. The agreement stipulated that the Mytileneans could dispatch an embassy to Athens to argue their case, and that Paches would refrain from imprisoning, enslaving, or executing any citizens until the embassy returned. These were the surrender conditions; nevertheless, the principal architects of the negotiations with Sparta were so paralyzed with fear when the army marched in that they fled to the altars for sanctuary. Paches persuaded them to rise with assurances of their safety and transported them to Tenedos, where they would remain until Athens decided their fate. Paches also dispatched warships to capture Antissa and implemented whatever military arrangements he deemed necessary.
Meanwhile, the Peloponnesian fleet of forty ships, which should have rushed to Mytilene's aid, wasted precious time navigating around the Peloponnese and proceeded at a leisurely pace for the rest of their journey. They reached Delos undetected by the Athenians in Athens, and continuing to Icarus and Myconos, first learned of Mytilene's fall. Seeking confirmation, they anchored at Embatum in Erythraean territory, arriving roughly seven days after the city's capture. Having verified the news, they deliberated their next move, and Teutiaplus, an Elean, offered this counsel:
"Alcidas and fellow Peloponnesian commanders of this expedition, I propose we sail immediately to Mytilene, just as we are, before news of our presence spreads. We can anticipate finding the Athenians in the typical state of negligence that follows a city's capture: this will especially apply at sea, where they expect no hostile action and where our principal advantage lies. Even their ground forces are likely dispersed among the houses, relaxed in victory. If we strike suddenly under cover of darkness, I believe, with assistance from any sympathizers remaining within the city, we can seize control. Let us embrace this risk, remembering that such situations exemplify the unfounded alarms that pervade warfare. The general who can both shield himself from such vulnerabilities and recognize when his opponent suffers from them is the one who achieves victory."
Historical Context
This passage describes the surrender of Mytilene to Athens in 427 BCE during the Peloponnesian War. The city had revolted from the Athenian empire with Spartan encouragement but received inadequate support. The Athenian general Paches negotiated the city's capitulation with surprisingly lenient initial terms, though the pro-Spartan leaders were detained for later judgment. Meanwhile, a Peloponnesian relief fleet under Alcidas arrived too late but debated whether to attempt a surprise attack on the now-occupied city. This episode illustrates the precarious nature of revolt against Athens and the often-sluggish Spartan response to allied crises. The fate of Mytilene would become one of the war's most controversial episodes when Athens later debated whether to execute the entire male population.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Sanctuary and Sacred Space
The fleeing to altars demonstrates the ancient Greek concept of religious sanctuary (asylia). Suppliants who reached sacred spaces were theoretically protected from violence, as harming them would constitute sacrilege. This custom created tension between religious obligation and political necessity.
Learn more →Naval Strategy in the Peloponnesian War
Teutiaplus's proposal highlights the importance of naval surprise attacks. The Athenians' naval supremacy made them complacent, creating opportunities for bold strikes. His speech reflects contemporary military thinking about exploiting enemy overconfidence after victory.
Learn more →The Mytilenean Debate
This surrender sets up the famous Mytilenean Debate in the Athenian assembly, where Cleon and Diodotus argue over the fate of the city. The debate becomes a cornerstone text for understanding Athenian imperial ideology and the tension between justice and expediency.
Learn more →Surrender at Discretion
The phrase 'surrender at discretion' (κατὰ κράτος) meant unconditional surrender, placing the defeated entirely at the victor's mercy. Despite this harsh legal position, Paches negotiated specific protections, showing how military commanders could moderate terms on the ground.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.55)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of the Mytilenean revolt and its suppression, though with less detail than Thucydides. He emphasizes the harshness of the initial Athenian response.
Read passage →Aristotle: Politics (1304a4-10)
Aristotle uses Mytilene as an example of how oligarchic factions can destabilize a state, referencing the same pro-Spartan leaders who fled to the altars in this passage.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.6.12-15)
Xenophon describes similar scenarios of delayed Spartan naval relief, showing this was a persistent strategic weakness throughout the war, not just at Mytilene.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Paches's negotiation of specific protections despite 'unconditional surrender' reflect the gap between formal terms and practical governance?
- What does Teutiaplus's speech reveal about ancient Greek assumptions regarding the psychology of victory and defeat?
- Why might Thucydides include the detail about the pro-Spartan leaders fleeing to altars? What does this suggest about the relationship between religious and political authority?
- How does the Spartan fleet's delay reflect broader patterns in the Peloponnesian War? What does this suggest about Sparta's reliability as an ally?