Today's Passage
This passage describes Athenian military operations during 426 BCE, the fifth year of the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
During the same summer different operations were carried on by the different belligerents in Sicily; by the Siceliots themselves against each other, and by the Athenians and their allies: I shall however confine myself to the actions in which the Athenians took part, choosing the most important. The death of the Athenian general Charoeades, killed by the Syracusans in battle, left Laches in the sole command of the fleet, which he now directed in concert with the allies against Mylae, a place belonging to the Messinese. Two Messinese battalions in garrison at Mylae laid an ambush for the party landing from the ships, but were routed with great slaughter by the Athenians and their allies, who thereupon assaulted the fortification and compelled them to surrender the Acropolis and to march with them upon Messina. This town afterwards also submitted upon the approach of the Athenians and their allies, and gave hostages and all other securities required.
The same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships round Peloponnese under Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Procles, son of Theodorus, and sixty others, with two thousand heavy infantry, against Melos, under Nicias, son of Niceratus; wishing to reduce the Melians, who, although islanders, refused to be subjects of Athens or even to join her confederacy. The devastation of their land not procuring their submission, the fleet, weighing from Melos, sailed to Oropus in the territory of Graea, and landing at nightfall, the heavy infantry started at once from the ships by land for Tanagra in Boeotia, where they were met by the whole levy from Athens, agreeably to a concerted signal, under the command of Hipponicus, son of Callias, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. They encamped, and passing that day in ravaging the Tanagraean territory, remained there for the night; and next day, after defeating those of the Tanagraeans who sailed out against them and some Thebans who had come up to help the Tanagraeans, took some arms, set up a trophy, and retired, the troops to the city and the others to the ships. Nicias with his sixty ships coasted alongshore and ravaged the Locrian seaboard, and so returned home.
Modern Translation
During that same summer, various military operations were conducted throughout Sicily, both by the Sicilian Greeks fighting among themselves and by the Athenians with their allies. I will limit myself to describing those engagements involving Athenian forces, selecting only the most significant. After the Athenian general Charoeades was killed in combat by the Syracusans, Laches assumed sole command of the fleet. Working in coordination with allied forces, he directed operations against Mylae, a stronghold controlled by Messina. Two Messenian battalions stationed at Mylae attempted to ambush the landing party from the ships, but the Athenians and their allies decisively defeated them, inflicting heavy casualties. Following this victory, they besieged the fortification and forced the defenders to surrender the acropolis and accompany them on a march against Messina. When the Athenian-led force approached, Messina itself capitulated, providing hostages and meeting all other demanded guarantees.
That same summer, the Athenians dispatched two separate naval expeditions. Thirty ships sailed around the Peloponnese under the command of Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and Procles, son of Theodorus. Meanwhile, sixty ships carrying two thousand hoplites, commanded by Nicias, son of Niceratus, sailed against Melos. The Athenians sought to subjugate the Melians, who, despite being islanders, refused both to submit to Athenian rule and to join the Delian League. When devastating their territory failed to secure their surrender, the fleet departed Melos for Oropus in Graean territory. Landing under cover of darkness, the hoplites immediately marched overland toward Tanagra in Boeotia. There, according to prearranged plans, they rendezvoused with the entire Athenian citizen army under Hipponicus, son of Callias, and Eurymedon, son of Thucles. After establishing camp, they spent the day plundering Tanagraean territory and remained overnight. The following day, they defeated a force of Tanagraeans who marched out to confront them, along with Theban reinforcements who had come to assist. After capturing weapons and erecting a trophy to mark their victory, they withdrew—the land forces returning to Athens while the naval contingent returned to their ships. Nicias then sailed along the Locrian coast with his sixty ships, ravaging the shoreline before returning home.
Historical Context
This passage describes Athenian military operations during 426 BCE, the fifth year of the Peloponnesian War. It showcases Athens' aggressive imperial policy on multiple fronts: consolidating control in Sicily through Laches' campaign against Messina, attempting to coerce the neutral island of Melos into submission, and conducting raids in central Greece near Theban territory. The operations demonstrate Athens' naval superiority and ability to project power across the Mediterranean. The failed attempt to subjugate Melos foreshadows the infamous Melian Dialogue and massacre that would occur a decade later. These simultaneous campaigns illustrate Athens' strategic overextension—fighting in Sicily while maintaining pressure on Sparta's allies in mainland Greece. The passage also reveals the interconnected nature of Greek warfare, with local conflicts (like the Sicilian wars) becoming entangled with the larger Peloponnesian conflict.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Athenian Imperialism
Athens' attempt to force Melos into submission exemplifies their imperial policy of compelling neutral states to join the Delian League. This 'join us or be destroyed' approach would culminate in the brutal Melian massacre of 416 BCE, making this early expedition historically significant as a precursor to one of Athens' most controversial acts.
Learn more →Sicilian Expedition Context
Laches' operations in Sicily represent Athens' early involvement in Sicilian affairs, over a decade before the disastrous Sicilian Expedition (415-413 BCE). These initial successes may have encouraged Athenian ambitions in the west, contributing to the later catastrophic overreach that would help seal Athens' defeat in the war.
Learn more →Greek Hoplite Warfare
The coordination between naval forces and hoplites landing for inland operations demonstrates the evolution of Greek combined-arms tactics. The trophy erected after victory was a standard Greek practice—a monument constructed from captured enemy arms to mark the turning point (tropē) of battle.
Learn more →Theban-Athenian Rivalry
Thebes' support for Tanagra against Athens reflects the deep animosity between these powers. Thebes was Sparta's most important Boeotian ally, and Athenian raids in Boeotia aimed to weaken Spartan influence in central Greece while threatening Thebes' regional hegemony.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (Book 12.65)
Diodorus provides additional details about Athenian operations in Sicily during this period, including the political dynamics between Sicilian cities and Athens' strategic objectives in supporting Leontini against Syracuse.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Nicias (Chapters 3-4)
Plutarch's biography offers character insights into Nicias, the commander of the Melian expedition, portraying him as cautious and religious—traits that would later prove fatal during the Sicilian Expedition he reluctantly led.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (Book 1.1.1-10)
Though covering later events, Xenophon's account shows the long-term consequences of Athens' aggressive policies described here, particularly how overextension in multiple theaters contributed to their eventual defeat.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How do these simultaneous military operations reflect Athens' imperial ambitions, and what do they suggest about the sustainability of such a strategy?
- Compare Athens' treatment of Mylae/Messina (which surrendered) with their approach to Melos (which resisted). What does this reveal about Athenian imperial policy?
- Why might Thucydides have chosen to describe these particular operations while acknowledging he's being selective? What narrative purpose do they serve?
- How does the coordination between naval and land forces in these operations demonstrate the evolution of Greek warfare during this period?