Today's Passage
This passage describes a critical moment in 426 BCE during the Archidamian War phase of the Peloponnesian conflict.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The same summer, about the same time that the Athenians were detained at Melos, their fellow citizens in the thirty ships cruising round Peloponnese, after cutting off some guards in an ambush at Ellomenus in Leucadia, subsequently went against Leucas itself with a large armament, having been reinforced by the whole levy of the Acarnanians except Oeniadae, and by the Zacynthians and Cephallenians and fifteen ships from Corcyra. While the Leucadians witnessed the devastation of their land, without and within the isthmus upon which the town of Leucas and the temple of Apollo stand, without making any movement on account of the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, the Acarnanians urged Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to build a wall so as to cut off the town from the continent, a measure which they were convinced would secure its capture and rid them once and for all of a most troublesome enemy.
Demosthenes however had in the meanwhile been persuaded by the Messenians that it was a fine opportunity for him, having so large an army assembled, to attack the Aetolians, who were not only the enemies of Naupactus, but whose reduction would further make it easy to gain the rest of that part of the continent for the Athenians. The Aetolian nation, although numerous and warlike, yet dwelt in unwalled villages scattered far apart, and had nothing but light armour, and might, according to the Messenians, be subdued without much difficulty before succours could arrive. The plan which they recommended was to attack first the Apodotians, next the Ophionians, and after these the Eurytanians, who are the largest tribe in Aetolia, and speak, as is said, a language exceedingly difficult to understand, and eat their flesh raw. These once subdued, the rest would easily come in.
Modern Translation
That same summer, around the time the Athenians were occupied at Melos, their compatriots commanding thirty ships cruising around the Peloponnese ambushed and killed some guards at Ellomenus in Leucadia. They then advanced against Leucas itself with a substantial force, having been reinforced by the entire Acarnanian levy (except for Oeniadae), as well as contingents from Zacynthus and Cephallenia, plus fifteen Corcyraean ships. The Leucadians could only watch helplessly as their territory was ravaged both outside and within the isthmus where their city and the temple of Apollo were located. Overwhelmed by the enemy's superior numbers, they dared not venture out. The Acarnanians pressed Demosthenes, the Athenian commander, to construct a wall that would sever the city from the mainland—a strategy they believed would guarantee its capture and permanently eliminate this persistent threat.
However, the Messenians had meanwhile convinced Demosthenes that with such a formidable army at his disposal, he had an ideal opportunity to strike at the Aetolians. These people were enemies of Naupactus, and their defeat would facilitate Athenian control over the remaining mainland territories. Though the Aetolian nation was populous and martial, the Messenians argued that they lived in unfortified villages widely dispersed across the landscape and possessed only light armor. They could therefore be conquered without great difficulty before reinforcements arrived. The proposed strategy was to attack the Apodotians first, then the Ophionians, and finally the Eurytanians—the most numerous Aetolian tribe, who allegedly spoke an almost incomprehensible dialect and consumed raw meat. Once these were defeated, the remaining tribes would readily submit.
Historical Context
This passage describes a critical moment in 426 BCE during the Archidamian War phase of the Peloponnesian conflict. The Athenian general Demosthenes is leading a major expedition in northwestern Greece with substantial allied support. Initially targeting Leucas, an important Spartan ally controlling access to the Corinthian Gulf, Demosthenes faces a strategic decision. The Acarnanians, Athens' local allies, want him to besiege Leucas systematically. However, the Messenians from Naupactus persuade him to attempt a more ambitious campaign against the Aetolians instead. This decision proves fateful—the subsequent Aetolian campaign ends in disaster for Athens, though Thucydides hasn't revealed this yet. The passage illustrates how local allied interests could influence Athenian strategy and how overconfidence in superior forces could lead to strategic miscalculation.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Aetolian Society
The Aetolians were a tribal confederation in mountainous central Greece, maintaining a more primitive social organization than the polis-based societies. Their decentralized structure, rough terrain, and guerrilla tactics made them formidable opponents despite lacking heavy armor or fortified cities.
Learn more →Greek Warfare Tactics
The contrast between hoplite warfare (heavy infantry) and light-armed troops was crucial in Greek military thinking. The Messenians' underestimation of the Aetolians' effectiveness with light armor in their mountainous homeland represents a common strategic error.
Learn more →Demosthenes as General
Demosthenes was one of Athens' most innovative commanders, known for unconventional tactics. His decision here to abandon the siege of Leucas for the Aetolian campaign shows both his ambition and susceptibility to persuasion by allies with their own agendas.
Learn more →Acarnanian Alliance
Acarnania's alliance with Athens was crucial for Athenian operations in northwestern Greece. Their persistent hostility toward Leucas stemmed from territorial disputes and the city's alliance with Sparta, making them eager to see it neutralized.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Pausanias: Description of Greece (10.18.1-7)
Pausanias describes the Aetolians and their customs, including their reputation for speaking an difficult dialect and their fierce independence, corroborating Thucydides' characterization.
Read passage →Polybius: Histories (4.3.1-5)
Polybius discusses Aetolian military tactics and their effectiveness in mountainous terrain, explaining why light-armed troops could be so effective against conventional hoplite forces.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.60)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of Demosthenes' campaigns in western Greece, though with less detail than Thucydides, offering a different perspective on the strategic decisions.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How do local allied interests complicate imperial strategy? Consider how the Acarnanians and Messenians each try to use Athenian power for their own purposes.
- What does this passage reveal about Greek assumptions regarding 'civilized' versus 'barbarian' ways of warfare? How do these prejudices affect military planning?
- Analyze Demosthenes' decision-making process. What factors seem to influence him most, and what does this suggest about command structures in democratic Athens?
- How does Thucydides use foreshadowing in this passage? What details suggest the coming disaster without explicitly stating it?