Today's Passage
This passage describes Demosthenes' ill-fated expedition against the Aetolians in 426 BCE, during the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
To this plan Demosthenes consented, not only to please the Messenians, but also in the belief that by adding the Aetolians to his other continental allies he would be able, without aid from home, to march against the Boeotians by way of Ozolian Locris to Kytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right until he descended to the Phocians, whom he could force to join him if their ancient friendship for Athens did not, as he anticipated, at once decide them to do so. Arrived in Phocis he was already upon the frontier of Boeotia. He accordingly weighed from Leucas, against the wish of the Acarnanians, and with his whole armament sailed along the coast to Sollium, where he communicated to them his intention; and upon their refusing to agree to it on account of the non-investment of Leucas, himself with the rest of the forces, the Cephallenians, the Messenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenian marines from his own ships (the fifteen Corcyraean vessels having departed), started on his expedition against the Aetolians. His base he established at Oeneon in Locris, as the Ozolian Locrians were allies of Athens and were to meet him with all their forces in the interior. Being neighbours of the Aetolians and armed in the same way, it was thought that they would be of great service upon the expedition, from their acquaintance with the localities and the warfare of the inhabitants.
After bivouacking with the army in the precinct of Nemean Zeus, in which the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the people of the country, according to an oracle which had foretold that he should die in Nemea, Demosthenes set out at daybreak to invade Aetolia. The first day he took Potidania, the next Krokyle, and the third Tichium, where he halted and sent back the booty to Eupalium in Locris, having determined to pursue his conquests as far as the Ophionians, and, in the event of their refusing to submit, to return to Naupactus and make them the objects of a second expedition. Meanwhile the Aetolians had been aware of his design from the moment of its formation, and as soon as the army invaded their country came up in great force with all their tribes; even the most remote Ophionians, the Bomiensians, and Calliensians, who extend towards the Malian Gulf, being among the number.
Modern Translation
Demosthenes agreed to this plan, not merely to gratify the Messenians, but because he believed that by adding the Aetolians to his existing mainland allies, he would be able to march against the Boeotians without requiring reinforcements from Athens. His route would take him through Ozolian Locris to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Mount Parnassus on his right as he descended into Phocian territory. He expected to compel the Phocians to join his campaign, or hoped their traditional friendship with Athens would prompt them to do so voluntarily. Once in Phocis, he would already be at the Boeotian frontier. He therefore set sail from Leucas despite Acarnanian objections, and with his entire fleet sailed along the coast to Sollium. There he revealed his intentions to the Acarnanians, who refused to participate because of their anger over the failure to besiege Leucas. Demosthenes proceeded without them, leading the remaining forces—Cephallenians, Messenians, Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenian marines from his own ships (the fifteen Corcyraean vessels had already departed). He launched his campaign against the Aetolians, establishing his base at Oeneon in Locris. The Ozolian Locrians, being Athenian allies, were to rendezvous with him in full force in the interior. As neighbors of the Aetolians with similar armament, they were expected to prove invaluable to the expedition through their knowledge of the terrain and local fighting methods.
After spending the night with his army at the shrine of Nemean Zeus—where tradition holds that the poet Hesiod met his death at the hands of locals, fulfilling an oracle that predicted he would die in Nemea—Demosthenes began his invasion of Aetolia at dawn. On the first day he captured Potidania, on the second Crocyle, and on the third Teichium. There he paused to send the plunder back to Eupalium in Locris, planning to advance as far as Ophionian territory. If they resisted, he intended to return to Naupactus and mount a second campaign against them. However, the Aetolians had known of his plans from the beginning. As soon as his army crossed their borders, they mobilized in massive numbers from all their tribes—even the most distant Ophionians, Bomiensians, and Calliensians, whose lands stretched toward the Malian Gulf, joined the resistance.
Historical Context
This passage describes Demosthenes' ill-fated expedition against the Aetolians in 426 BCE, during the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War. The ambitious Athenian general, fresh from naval operations around western Greece, was persuaded by Messenian allies to attack Aetolia. His strategic goal was to create a land route to attack Boeotia from the west, bypassing Athenian enemies. The campaign began promisingly with the capture of several towns, but Demosthenes critically underestimated Aetolian resistance and unity. The Aetolians, though considered semi-barbarous by coastal Greeks, proved formidable opponents in their mountainous homeland. This expedition would end in disaster for Athens, with heavy losses among their hoplites in the difficult terrain, teaching a harsh lesson about the dangers of operating in unfamiliar territory against unconventional enemies.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Aetolian Geography and Society
Aetolia was a mountainous region in central Greece, inhabited by tribes considered backward by other Greeks. They lived in unwalled villages, spoke a difficult dialect, and allegedly ate raw meat. Despite this reputation, they were fierce warriors who effectively used their terrain and light-armed tactics against heavily armored hoplites.
Learn more →Hesiod's Death at Nemea
The poet Hesiod's death in Nemea was a famous story in antiquity. According to tradition, he was murdered by locals who suspected him of seducing a woman. The oracle at Delphi had warned him to avoid Nemea, which he understood to mean the famous Nemea in the Peloponnese, not realizing there was another shrine to Nemean Zeus in Locris.
Learn more →Athenian Military Strategy
Demosthenes' plan reveals typical Athenian strategic thinking: using naval mobility to strike where enemies were weak, building coalitions with local allies, and attempting to open new fronts. His goal of reaching Boeotia by an unexpected western route shows creative strategic planning, though it ultimately failed due to poor intelligence about local conditions.
Learn more →Greek Coalition Warfare
This passage illustrates the complex nature of Greek warfare, where success often depended on assembling coalitions of allies with local knowledge. The defection of the Acarnanians over the Leucas issue and the expected support from Ozolian Locrians show how personal and political considerations affected military operations.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.60)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of Demosthenes' Aetolian campaign, though with less detail than Thucydides. He emphasizes the disaster that befell the Athenians and the role of Aetolian javelin-throwers in defeating the hoplites.
Read passage →Pausanias: Description of Greece (10.18.7)
Pausanias mentions the Aetolian resistance to various invaders, including this Athenian expedition. He provides geographical details about the region and explains why the mountainous terrain favored the defenders.
Read passage →Plutarch: Life of Nicias (3.4)
Though focused on Nicias, Plutarch mentions other Athenian generals' failures, including Demosthenes in Aetolia, as context for understanding Athenian military leadership during the Peloponnesian War.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Demosthenes' strategic vision of opening a western route to Boeotia reflect both the opportunities and limitations of Athenian power during the Peloponnesian War?
- What does the Acarnanian refusal to participate reveal about the challenges of maintaining allied coalitions in ancient Greek warfare?
- How might Demosthenes' apparent ignorance of Aetolian military capabilities reflect broader Athenian attitudes toward 'barbarian' or semi-Hellenized peoples?
- What role does local knowledge play in this narrative, and what does this suggest about the nature of ancient warfare?