Today's Passage
This passage describes the disastrous Athenian expedition against the Aetolians in 426 BCE, led by the general Demosthenes.
Crawley Translation (1910)
The Messenians, however, adhered to their original advice. Assuring Demosthenes that the Aetolians were an easy conquest, they urged him to push on as rapidly as possible, and to try to take the villages as fast as he came up to them, without waiting until the whole nation should be in arms against him. Led on by his advisers and trusting in his fortune, as he had met with no opposition, without waiting for his Locrian reinforcements, who were to have supplied him with the light-armed darters in which he was most deficient, he advanced and stormed Aegitium, the inhabitants flying before him and posting themselves upon the hills above the town, which stood on high ground about nine miles from the sea. Meanwhile the Aetolians had gathered to the rescue, and now attacked the Athenians and their allies, running down from the hills on every side and darting their javelins, falling back when the Athenian army advanced, and coming on as it retired; and for a long while the battle was of this character, alternate advance and retreat, in both which operations the Athenians had the worst.
Still as long as their archers had arrows left and were able to use them, they held out, the light-armed Aetolians retiring before the arrows; but after the captain of the archers had been killed and his men scattered, the soldiers, wearied out with the constant repetition of the same exertions and hard pressed by the Aetolians with their javelins, at last turned and fled, and falling into pathless gullies and places that they were unacquainted with, thus perished, the Messenian Chromon, their guide, having also unfortunately been killed. A great many were overtaken in the pursuit by the swift-footed and light-armed Aetolians, and fell beneath their javelins; the greater number however missed their road and rushed into the wood, which had no ways out, and which was soon fired and burnt round them by the enemy. Indeed the Athenian army fell victims to death in every form, and suffered all the vicissitudes of flight; the survivors escaped with difficulty to the sea and Oeneon in Locris, whence they had set out. Many of the allies were killed, and about one hundred and twenty Athenian heavy infantry, not a man less, and all in the prime of life. These were by far the best men in the city of Athens that fell during this war. Among the slain was also Procles, the colleague of Demosthenes. Meanwhile the Athenians took up their dead under truce from the Aetolians, and retired to Naupactus, and from thence went in their ships to Athens; Demosthenes staying behind in Naupactus and in the neighbourhood, being afraid to face the Athenians after the disaster.
About the same time the Athenians on the coast of Sicily sailed to Locris, and in a descent which they made from the ships defeated the Locrians who came against them, and took a fort upon the river Halex.
Modern Translation
The Messenians, however, stuck to their original recommendation. They assured Demosthenes that conquering the Aetolians would be straightforward, and pressed him to advance as quickly as possible, urging him to capture each village immediately upon reaching it rather than waiting for the entire Aetolian nation to mobilize against him. Encouraged by his advisers and trusting in his good fortune—since he had encountered no resistance thus far—Demosthenes pressed forward without waiting for his Locrian reinforcements, who were supposed to provide the light-armed javelin-throwers he desperately needed. He advanced and captured Aegitium by storm, as its inhabitants fled before him and took up positions on the hills above the town, which was situated on high ground approximately nine miles inland from the sea. By this time, however, the Aetolians had assembled for a counterattack. They now assaulted the Athenians and their allies, rushing down from the surrounding hills while hurling javelins, retreating whenever the Athenian forces advanced, then pressing forward again as they withdrew. The battle continued in this pattern for an extended period—alternating advances and retreats—with the Athenians getting the worst of both movements.
The Athenians managed to hold their ground as long as their archers still had arrows and could employ them effectively, since the lightly-armed Aetolians fell back before the arrow fire. But once the archer captain was killed and his men scattered, the soldiers—exhausted from repeatedly performing the same maneuvers and under severe pressure from the Aetolian javelin attacks—finally broke and ran. They stumbled into trackless ravines and unfamiliar terrain where they perished, especially after their Messenian guide Chromon was killed. The swift-footed, light-armed Aetolians overtook many fugitives during the pursuit, cutting them down with javelins. Most of the fleeing soldiers, however, lost their way and plunged into a forest that had no exits, which the enemy promptly surrounded and set ablaze. The Athenian force suffered every conceivable form of death and experienced all the horrors that accompany a rout. The survivors barely managed to escape to the coast and Oeneon in Locris, their original departure point. Numerous allies perished, along with approximately one hundred and twenty Athenian heavy infantry—not one fewer—all men in their prime. These were unquestionably the finest Athenian soldiers to die during the entire war. Among the dead was Procles, Demosthenes' fellow commander. The Athenians recovered their dead under a truce with the Aetolians and withdrew to Naupactus, then sailed home to Athens. Demosthenes remained behind in Naupactus and the surrounding area, too frightened to face the Athenians after this catastrophe.
Around this same time, the Athenian forces stationed along the Sicilian coast sailed to Locris, where they landed and defeated the Locrian defenders who came out to meet them, subsequently capturing a fortress on the river Halex.
Historical Context
This passage describes the disastrous Athenian expedition against the Aetolians in 426 BCE, led by the general Demosthenes. Acting on poor intelligence from Messenian allies who claimed the Aetolians would be easy to defeat, Demosthenes advanced into mountainous Aetolia without waiting for crucial reinforcements. The Aetolians, expert in guerrilla warfare and familiar with their terrain, ambushed the heavily-armed Athenian hoplites using hit-and-run tactics with javelins. The battle turned into a rout when the Athenian archers ran out of arrows and their guide was killed. The defeat cost Athens 120 elite hoplites—a significant loss early in the war. Demosthenes' tactical failure here contrasts sharply with his later successes at Pylos, demonstrating how terrain and appropriate forces determined ancient warfare outcomes.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Ancient Greek Warfare Tactics
This battle illustrates the vulnerability of heavily-armed hoplites against light-armed troops in mountainous terrain. The Aetolians used classic guerrilla tactics—attacking with javelins then retreating before the enemy could engage in close combat. This exposed the limitations of traditional Greek phalanx warfare when operating outside suitable terrain.
Learn more →Aetolian League
The Aetolians were a confederation of tribes in mountainous central Greece, known for their fierce independence and skill in irregular warfare. Their successful defense against Athens here enhanced their reputation and political importance, eventually leading to their emergence as a major Hellenistic power.
Learn more →Demosthenes (general)
This Athenian general's career shows dramatic reversals of fortune. His failure in Aetolia nearly ended his career, but he later achieved brilliant victories at Pylos and Amphipolis using innovative tactics. His ability to learn from this defeat shaped his later unconventional strategies.
Learn more →Light-armed Troops in Greek Warfare
This battle demonstrates the growing importance of psiloi (light infantry) and missile troops in Greek warfare. The Athenians' lack of light-armed support proved fatal against the javelin-armed Aetolians, showing how combined-arms tactics were becoming essential for military success.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Pausanias: Description of Greece (10.18.7)
Pausanias mentions the Aetolians' reputation as formidable warriors who successfully resisted multiple invasions, providing cultural context for their victory over the Athenians and their guerrilla warfare expertise.
Read passage →Xenophon: Anabasis (3.3-4)
Xenophon describes similar problems faced by Greek heavy infantry when attacked by light-armed enemies in mountainous terrain during the Ten Thousand's retreat, showing this was a recurring tactical challenge for hoplite armies.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.60)
Diodorus provides a parallel account of this campaign, offering additional details about Demosthenes' motivations and the political consequences of the defeat for Athenian strategy in western Greece.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does this passage illustrate the importance of intelligence, local knowledge, and appropriate force composition in military operations? What modern parallels can you identify?
- What does Demosthenes' decision to remain at Naupactus rather than return to Athens reveal about Athenian political culture and the accountability of military commanders?
- How does Thucydides' detailed description of the battle's progression serve his larger historiographical purposes? What lessons about war is he conveying?
- Compare the role of terrain and unconventional warfare in this passage with modern asymmetric conflicts. What timeless principles of warfare emerge?