Today's Passage
This passage describes two simultaneous military operations in 425 BCE during the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
Their arrival at once put an end to the armistice at Pylos, and the Lacedaemonians asked back their ships according to the convention. The Athenians, however, alleged an attack on the fort in contravention of the truce, and other grievances seemingly not worth mentioning, and refused to give them back, insisting upon the clause by which the slightest infringement made the armistice void. The Lacedaemonians, after denying the contravention and protesting against their bad faith in the matter of the ships, went away and earnestly addressed themselves to the war. Hostilities were now carried on at Pylos upon both sides with vigour. The Athenians cruised round the island all day with two ships going different ways; and by night, except on the seaward side in windy weather, anchored round it with their whole fleet, which, having been reinforced by twenty ships from Athens come to aid in the blockade, now numbered seventy sail; while the Peloponnesians remained encamped on the continent, making attacks on the fort, and on the look-out for any opportunity which might offer itself for the deliverance of their men.
Meanwhile the Syracusans and their allies in Sicily had brought up to the squadron guarding Messina the reinforcement which we left them preparing, and carried on the war from thence, incited chiefly by the Locrians from hatred of the Rhegians, whose territory they had invaded with all their forces. The Syracusans also wished to try their fortune at sea, seeing that the Athenians had only a few ships actually at Rhegium, and hearing that the main fleet destined to join them was engaged in blockading the island. A naval victory, they thought, would enable them to blockade Rhegium by sea and land, and easily to reduce it; a success which would at once place their affairs upon a solid basis, the promontory of Rhegium in Italy and Messina in Sicily being so near each other that it would be impossible for the Athenians to cruise against them and command the strait. The strait in question consists of the sea between Rhegium and Messina, at the point where Sicily approaches nearest to the continent, and is the Charybdis through which the story makes Ulysses sail; and the narrowness of the passage and the strength of the current that pours in from the vast Tyrrhenian and Sicilian mains, have rightly given it a bad reputation.
Modern Translation
When they arrived, the truce at Pylos immediately ended. The Spartans requested the return of their ships according to the agreement. However, the Athenians refused, claiming the Spartans had violated the truce by attacking the fort, along with other complaints that seemed trivial. They stood firm on the treaty clause stating that any breach, however minor, would nullify the entire agreement. The Spartans denied any violation and accused the Athenians of acting in bad faith regarding the ships. They departed and threw themselves wholeheartedly into prosecuting the war. Both sides now fought vigorously at Pylos. The Athenians maintained a continuous patrol around the island with two ships circling in opposite directions during the day. At night, except when storms made the seaward side dangerous, they anchored their entire fleet around the island. This fleet had grown to seventy ships after twenty reinforcements arrived from Athens to strengthen the blockade. Meanwhile, the Peloponnesians remained encamped on the mainland, repeatedly attacking the fort while watching for any chance to rescue their trapped men.
Meanwhile in Sicily, the Syracusans and their allies had brought reinforcements to their squadron stationed at Messina, which we mentioned they were preparing earlier. They conducted operations from there, primarily encouraged by the Locrians who hated the Rhegians and had invaded their territory with their entire army. The Syracusans also wanted to test their naval capabilities, knowing the Athenians had only a small squadron at Rhegium and hearing that their main fleet was occupied blockading the island. They believed a naval victory would allow them to blockade Rhegium by both sea and land, making its capture easy. Such success would significantly strengthen their position, since the Italian promontory of Rhegium and Sicilian Messina are so close together that the Athenians would be unable to patrol against them or control the strait. This strait between Rhegium and Messina, where Sicily comes closest to the mainland, is the legendary Charybdis through which Odysseus sailed. The narrow passage and powerful currents flowing in from the vast Tyrrhenian and Sicilian seas have justly earned it its fearsome reputation.
Historical Context
This passage describes two simultaneous military operations in 425 BCE during the Peloponnesian War. At Pylos, the Athenians have trapped Spartan hoplites on the island of Sphacteria and are maintaining a naval blockade after negotiations broke down. The Athenians' refusal to return Spartan ships on a technicality shows their advantageous position and determination to press their unexpected success. Meanwhile, in Sicily, Syracuse and its allies are preparing to challenge Athens' limited naval presence, seeing an opportunity while the main Athenian fleet is occupied at Pylos. The strategic importance of controlling the Strait of Messina between Sicily and Italy is emphasized, as it would allow Syracuse to dominate regional naval movements. These parallel narratives illustrate how Athens' imperial commitments created vulnerabilities that enemies could exploit.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
The Siege of Sphacteria
The blockade of Sphacteria was a pivotal moment in the war. Spartan hoplites trapped on the island represented an unprecedented vulnerability for Sparta, whose warrior culture could not accept their loss. This situation gave Athens significant diplomatic leverage and challenged Spartan military prestige.
Learn more →Ancient Naval Warfare
Naval blockades required continuous patrols to prevent supplies reaching besieged forces. The Athenian tactic of having ships circle in opposite directions ensured complete coverage. Night anchorage was avoided on exposed coasts due to weather risks, showing the practical limitations of ancient naval operations.
Learn more →The Strait of Messina
The narrow strait between Sicily and Italy was strategically crucial for controlling maritime trade and military movements. Thucydides connects it to Homer's Charybdis, showing how geographical knowledge was transmitted through literary tradition. Control of this chokepoint would effectively divide the eastern and western Mediterranean.
Learn more →Syracuse in the Peloponnesian War
Syracuse was the most powerful Greek city in Sicily and Athens' primary opponent in the west. Their growing naval ambitions challenged Athenian hegemony at sea. The Sicilian theater would eventually become the site of Athens' most catastrophic defeat in 413 BCE.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (7.1-4)
Plutarch describes the Athenian confidence following Pylos and how it influenced their decision to maintain an aggressive stance rather than accepting Spartan peace offers, showing the psychological impact of the victory.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.61-63)
Diodorus provides an alternative account of the Pylos campaign, offering different details about the negotiations and the Athenian justification for keeping the Spartan ships, though his version is likely derivative of Thucydides.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.1-2)
Though covering later events, Xenophon describes similar Athenian naval blockade tactics in the Hellespont, showing the continuity of Athenian naval strategy and the importance of controlling strategic waterways.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Thucydides present the breakdown of diplomatic agreements? What does the dispute over the ships reveal about the relationship between power and justice in international relations?
- Why does Thucydides include the mythological reference to Charybdis? How does this blend of myth and geography affect his credibility as a historian?
- What strategic vulnerabilities of the Athenian Empire are revealed by these simultaneous crises at Pylos and in Sicily?
- How do the Athenians' actions at Pylos reflect their national character as Thucydides presents it throughout his work?