Today's Passage
This passage comes from Nicias's speech opposing the Sicilian Expedition in 415 BCE.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“And yet the latter, if brought under, might be kept under; while the Sicilians, even if conquered, are too far off and too numerous to be ruled without difficulty. Now it is folly to go against men who could not be kept under even if conquered, while failure would leave us in a very different position from that which we occupied before the enterprise. The Siceliots, again, to take them as they are at present, in the event of a Syracusan conquest (the favourite bugbear of the Egestaeans), would to my thinking be even less dangerous to us than before. At present they might possibly come here as separate states for love of Lacedaemon; in the other case one empire would scarcely attack another; for after joining the Peloponnesians to overthrow ours, they could only expect to see the same hands overthrow their own in the same way. The Hellenes in Sicily would fear us most if we never went there at all, and next to this, if after displaying our power we went away again as soon as possible. We all know that that which is farthest off, and the reputation of which can least be tested, is the object of admiration; at the least reverse they would at once begin to look down upon us, and would join our enemies here against us. You have yourselves experienced this with regard to the Lacedaemonians and their allies, whom your unexpected success, as compared with what you feared at first, has made you suddenly despise, tempting you further to aspire to the conquest of Sicily. Instead, however, of being puffed up by the misfortunes of your adversaries, you ought to think of breaking their spirit before giving yourselves up to confidence, and to understand that the one thought awakened in the Lacedaemonians by their disgrace is how they may even now, if possible, overthrow us and repair their dishonour; inasmuch as military reputation is their oldest and chiefest study. Our struggle, therefore, if we are wise, will not be for the barbarian Egestaeans in Sicily, but how to defend ourselves most effectually against the oligarchical machinations of Lacedaemon.
Modern Translation
Yet even if we subdued them, they could be held in subjection; but the Sicilians, even if defeated, are too distant and too numerous to govern without great difficulty. It is sheer folly to attack people whom we couldn't control even after conquering them, while defeat would leave us far worse off than we are now. As for the Sicilian Greeks—to consider their current situation—I believe that if Syracuse conquered them (the scenario the Egestaeans constantly invoke to frighten us), they would actually pose less danger to us than they do now. At present, individual cities might come here to fight us out of friendship with Sparta; but if Syracuse ruled them all, one empire would hardly attack another. For if they joined the Peloponnesians to destroy our empire, they could only expect their own to be destroyed by the same alliance in the same manner. The Greeks in Sicily would fear us most if we never appeared there at all, and second to that, if we displayed our power briefly and then withdrew immediately. We all know that what is distant and cannot be easily verified inspires the greatest awe; at the first setback, they would immediately lose respect for us and ally with our enemies here. You've experienced this yourselves with the Spartans and their allies—your unexpected success, compared to your initial fears, has suddenly made you contemptuous of them, now tempting you to pursue the conquest of Sicily. Instead of becoming overconfident because of your enemies' misfortunes, you should focus on completely crushing their morale before indulging in such confidence. You must understand that the Spartans' only thought, stirred by their humiliation, is how they might even now overthrow us and restore their honor—since military glory is their most ancient and paramount concern. Therefore, if we are prudent, our struggle won't be for the barbarian Egestaeans in Sicily, but rather how to most effectively defend ourselves against Sparta's oligarchic conspiracies.
Historical Context
This passage comes from Nicias's speech opposing the Sicilian Expedition in 415 BCE. As one of Athens's leading generals and a conservative politician, Nicias is attempting to dissuade the Athenian assembly from voting to send a massive expeditionary force to Sicily. The immediate context is a debate following appeals from Egesta (Segesta), a Sicilian city seeking Athenian help against Syracuse. Nicias argues that conquering Sicily would be impossible to maintain, that Syracuse poses no real threat, and that Athens should focus on the ongoing conflict with Sparta. His speech represents the voice of caution against Athenian imperial overreach. Ironically, despite his opposition, Nicias would be appointed one of the expedition's commanders, leading to his death and Athens's catastrophic defeat in 413 BCE.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Athenian Imperialism
Athens's empire relied on naval power to control distant territories. Nicias highlights the practical limits of imperial control, arguing that Sicily's distance and population make permanent subjugation impossible, foreshadowing the disaster that would indeed unfold.
Learn more →Egesta (Segesta)
A non-Greek ('barbarian') city in western Sicily that sought Athenian aid against Selinus and Syracuse. Their embassy's exaggerated promises of wealth helped persuade Athens to intervene, though Nicias dismisses them as unworthy barbarians.
Learn more →Syracuse
The most powerful Greek city in Sicily, founded by Corinth. Syracuse's potential hegemony over Sicily is presented by pro-war speakers as a threat to Athens, but Nicias argues that a unified Sicily under Syracuse would actually be less dangerous than the current fragmented situation.
Learn more →Spartan Military Reputation
Sparta's society was organized around military excellence from the 7th century BCE. Nicias warns that recent Athenian victories (particularly at Pylos in 425 BCE) shouldn't breed overconfidence, as Spartan culture ensures they will relentlessly seek to restore their damaged prestige.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Nicias (12.1-2)
Plutarch describes Nicias's opposition to the expedition and his warnings about its dangers, providing personal details about his cautious character and religious concerns that complement Thucydides's political analysis.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.83-84)
Diodorus provides an alternative account of the debate, emphasizing the role of Alcibiades in promoting the expedition and the Egestaean deception about their resources.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (1.1.1-2)
Though Xenophon begins where Thucydides ends, his opening references the aftermath of Sicily, showing how the disaster Nicias predicted indeed left Athens vulnerable to Spartan victory.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Nicias's argument about the impossibility of ruling distant territories relate to modern debates about military intervention and nation-building?
- Why might Nicias's logical arguments have failed to persuade the Athenian assembly? What does this suggest about the relationship between rational argument and democratic decision-making?
- Nicias argues that mystery and distance create fear and respect. How does this principle apply to power projection in both ancient and modern contexts?
- What does Nicias's characterization of the Egestaeans as 'barbarians' reveal about Greek attitudes toward non-Greeks, even when they were potential allies?