Today's Passage
This passage presents a speech by Archidamus, the Spartan king, addressing the Spartan assembly in 432 BCE as they debate whether to declare war on Athens.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“I have not lived so long, Lacedaemonians, without having had the experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same age as myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for war from inexperience or from a belief in its advantage and its safety. This, the war on which you are now debating, would be one of the greatest magnitude, on a sober consideration of the matter. In a struggle with Peloponnesians and neighbours our strength is of the same character, and it is possible to move swiftly on the different points. But a struggle with a people who live in a distant land, who have also an extraordinary familiarity with the sea, and who are in the highest state of preparation in every other department; with wealth private and public, with ships, and horses, and heavy infantry, and a population such as no one other Hellenic place can equal, and lastly a number of tributary allies—what can justify us in rashly beginning such a struggle? wherein is our trust that we should rush on it unprepared? Is it in our ships? There we are inferior; while if we are to practise and become a match for them, time must intervene. Is it in our money? There we have a far greater deficiency. We neither have it in our treasury, nor are we ready to contribute it from our private funds. Confidence might possibly be felt in our superiority in heavy infantry and population, which will enable us to invade and devastate their lands. But the Athenians have plenty of other land in their empire, and can import what they want by sea. Again, if we are to attempt an insurrection of their allies, these will have to be supported with a fleet, most of them being islanders. What then is to be our war? For unless we can either beat them at sea, or deprive them of the revenues which feed their navy, we shall meet with little but disaster. Meanwhile our honour will be pledged to keeping on, particularly if it be the opinion that we began the quarrel. For let us never be elated by the fatal hope of the war being quickly ended by the devastation of their lands. I fear rather that we may leave it as a legacy to our children; so improbable is it that the Athenian spirit will be the slave of their land, or Athenian experience be cowed by war.
Modern Translation
I have not lived this long, Spartans, without experiencing many wars, and I see among you men of my own age who will not make the common mistake of desiring war through inexperience or from believing it advantageous and safe. This war you are now considering would be of extraordinary magnitude, if you examine it carefully. When we fight against Peloponnesians and our neighbors, our capabilities are similar, and we can strike quickly at various targets. But a conflict with a people living far away, who possess exceptional naval expertise and are supremely prepared in every aspect—with both private and public wealth, ships, cavalry, heavy infantry, and a population unmatched by any other Greek state, plus numerous tribute-paying allies—what justifies our rushing unprepared into such a conflict? What gives us confidence to plunge in recklessly? Our ships? We are inferior there; and if we must train to match them, that requires time. Our finances? Here our deficiency is even greater. We lack treasury funds, nor are we prepared to contribute from personal wealth. We might feel confident in our superior heavy infantry and population, enabling us to invade and ravage their territory. But the Athenians control vast lands throughout their empire and can import necessities by sea. If we try to incite rebellion among their allies, we must support them with a fleet, since most are islanders. What kind of war would this be? Unless we can defeat them at sea or cut off the revenues funding their navy, we will face nothing but catastrophe. Meanwhile, our reputation will compel us to continue, especially if people believe we started the conflict. Let us never delude ourselves with the dangerous hope that devastating their lands will end the war quickly. I fear instead we will bequeath this conflict to our children; it is so unlikely that Athenian resolve will submit to the loss of territory, or that their experience will make them cower before war.
Historical Context
This passage presents a speech by Archidamus, the Spartan king, addressing the Spartan assembly in 432 BCE as they debate whether to declare war on Athens. The speech occurs during the final diplomatic crisis before the Peloponnesian War, after various allies have complained about Athenian aggression. Archidamus, an experienced military leader and personal friend of Pericles, argues against hasty action, providing a realistic assessment of Spartan disadvantages against Athenian naval power and economic resources. His analysis proves prophetic, as the war would indeed last 27 years and devastate Greece. This speech exemplifies Thucydides' interest in rational deliberation and the tension between passion and prudence in political decision-making.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Athenian Naval Supremacy
Athens maintained the most powerful navy in Greece, with over 300 triremes and experienced crews. Their thalassocracy (sea power) allowed them to control trade routes, maintain their empire, and project force throughout the Aegean, making traditional land-based warfare ineffective against them.
Learn more →Delian League Tribute
The Athenian empire collected annual tribute (phoros) from allied cities, generating enormous revenues that funded their navy and public works. This financial advantage, which Archidamus emphasizes, gave Athens resources far exceeding those of the agricultural Spartan state.
Learn more →Spartan Heavy Infantry
Sparta's military reputation rested on their hoplites (heavy infantry), considered the finest in Greece. However, Archidamus recognizes that superior land forces cannot defeat an enemy who controls the sea and can avoid decisive land battles while importing supplies.
Learn more →Greek Interstate Warfare
Traditional Greek warfare involved seasonal campaigns between neighboring city-states, usually resolved quickly through hoplite battles. Archidamus contrasts this with the unprecedented nature of a conflict against a distant naval power with an empire, anticipating the war's protracted character.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29-31)
Plutarch describes Pericles' strategy of avoiding land battles with Sparta and relying on Athenian naval supremacy, validating Archidamus' assessment of Athenian advantages and the ineffectiveness of traditional invasion tactics.
Read passage →Diodorus Siculus: Library of History (12.39-40)
Diodorus provides an alternative account of the Spartan debate, emphasizing the war party's arguments and the role of Corinthian pressure, offering contrast to Archidamus' cautious position.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (2.2.19-23)
Xenophon describes the end of the Peloponnesian War, showing how Sparta ultimately succeeded only by building a fleet with Persian gold, confirming Archidamus' prediction about the necessity of naval power.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Archidamus' military experience shape his analysis? What role should expertise play in democratic or oligarchic decision-making?
- Why might Archidamus' rational arguments fail to persuade? What factors beyond strategic calculation drive nations to war?
- How does Archidamus' prediction about leaving the war 'as a legacy to our children' reflect Greek attitudes toward intergenerational responsibility?
- What does this passage suggest about the relationship between honor, reputation, and strategic decision-making in ancient Greek politics?