Today's Passage
This passage presents a speech from Book 1 of Thucydides, likely delivered by the Corinthian King Archidamus II at a Spartan assembly in 432 BCE, just before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.
Crawley Translation (1910)
“Not that I would bid you be so unfeeling as to suffer them to injure your allies, and to refrain from unmasking their intrigues; but I do bid you not to take up arms at once, but to send and remonstrate with them in a tone not too suggestive of war, nor again too suggestive of submission, and to employ the interval in perfecting our own preparations. The means will be, first, the acquisition of allies, Hellenic or barbarian it matters not, so long as they are an accession to our strength naval or pecuniary—I say Hellenic or barbarian, because the odium of such an accession to all who like us are the objects of the designs of the Athenians is taken away by the law of self-preservation—and secondly the development of our home resources. If they listen to our embassy, so much the better; but if not, after the lapse of two or three years our position will have become materially strengthened, and we can then attack them if we think proper. Perhaps by that time the sight of our preparations, backed by language equally significant, will have disposed them to submission, while their land is still untouched, and while their counsels may be directed to the retention of advantages as yet undestroyed. For the only light in which you can view their land is that of a hostage in your hands, a hostage the more valuable the better it is cultivated. This you ought to spare as long as possible, and not make them desperate, and so increase the difficulty of dealing with them. For if while still unprepared, hurried away by the complaints of our allies, we are induced to lay it waste, have a care that we do not bring deep disgrace and deep perplexity upon Peloponnese. Complaints, whether of communities or individuals, it is possible to adjust; but war undertaken by a coalition for sectional interests, whose progress there is no means of foreseeing, does not easily admit of creditable settlement.
“And none need think it cowardice for a number of confederates to pause before they attack a single city. The Athenians have allies as numerous as our own, and allies that pay tribute, and war is a matter not so much of arms as of money, which makes arms of use. And this is more than ever true in a struggle between a continental and a maritime power. First, then, let us provide money, and not allow ourselves to be carried away by the talk of our allies before we have done so: as we shall have the largest share of responsibility for the consequences be they good or bad, we have also a right to a tranquil inquiry respecting them.
Modern Translation
I would not have you be so callous as to allow them to harm your allies or to ignore their scheming; but neither should you rush immediately to war. Instead, send envoys to protest their actions in language that neither threatens war too openly nor suggests weakness through submission. Use this interval to strengthen our own position. This means, first, acquiring allies—whether Greek or barbarian makes no difference, provided they add to our naval or financial strength. I say Greek or barbarian because when the Athenians threaten us as they do, the stigma of such alliances is erased by the necessity of self-preservation. Second, we must develop our domestic resources. If they heed our embassy, excellent; if not, after two or three years we will have grown considerably stronger and can then attack if we choose. Perhaps by then the sight of our preparations, combined with equally forceful diplomacy, will have brought them to terms while their territory remains intact and while they still deliberate over preserving their current advantages. You must understand that their land is essentially a hostage in your hands—and the more prosperous it is, the more valuable that hostage becomes. You should preserve it as long as possible rather than drive them to desperation and thereby make them harder to defeat. For if we rashly devastate their land now, while still unprepared, merely because our allies pressure us, we risk bringing both dishonor and serious complications upon the Peloponnese. Grievances, whether from states or individuals, can be negotiated; but a war begun by a coalition pursuing various separate interests, whose course no one can predict, rarely ends satisfactorily.
Let no one call it cowardice when numerous allied states hesitate before attacking a single city. The Athenians have just as many allies as we do, and theirs pay tribute. War depends less on weapons than on money, which gives weapons their effectiveness. This is especially true in a conflict between a land power and a naval power. Therefore, let us first secure our finances and not be swept along by our allies' rhetoric before doing so. Since we will bear the greatest responsibility for the outcome, whether favorable or disastrous, we also have the right to examine the situation calmly.
Historical Context
This passage presents a speech from Book 1 of Thucydides, likely delivered by the Corinthian King Archidamus II at a Spartan assembly in 432 BCE, just before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The speaker advocates for a measured response to Athenian aggression rather than immediate war. The strategic context involves growing tensions between Athens and Sparta's allies, particularly Corinth. The speaker recognizes Athens' naval superiority and the financial basis of their power through tribute from the Delian League. This speech represents the cautious, conservative approach that ultimately lost out to more hawkish voices. It demonstrates remarkable strategic insight about the nature of the coming conflict between a land power (Sparta) and a sea power (Athens), anticipating many of the difficulties Sparta would face in the long war ahead.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Athenian Empire and Tribute
The Athenian Empire, evolved from the Delian League, collected annual tribute (phoros) from allied cities. This financial system funded Athens' powerful navy and public works. By 432 BCE, Athens received about 400 talents annually, making it the wealthiest Greek state and enabling its imperial ambitions.
Learn more →Greek vs. Barbarian Alliances
The distinction between Greeks (Hellenes) and barbarians (non-Greeks) was fundamental to Greek identity. The speaker's willingness to ally with barbarians shows pragmatic desperation, as such alliances were traditionally viewed as shameful, especially after the Persian Wars.
Learn more →Naval vs. Land Warfare
The strategic divide between Athens (thalassocracy) and Sparta (land power) defined the Peloponnesian War. Naval powers required vast financial resources for ship construction, maintenance, and rower payment, while land powers relied on citizen-soldiers and traditional hoplite warfare.
Learn more →Spartan Decision-Making
Spartan foreign policy was decided in assemblies where kings, ephors, and citizens debated. The conservative, cautious approach advocated here reflects traditional Spartan reluctance to engage in extended foreign campaigns, a caution that would be overruled by allied pressure.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Pericles (29-31)
Describes Athenian financial resources and Pericles' strategy of avoiding land battles while relying on naval supremacy and imperial tribute, confirming the strategic analysis presented in this speech.
Read passage →Xenophon: Hellenica (2.2.3)
Details Spartan negotiations with Athens at war's end, showing how Spartan hesitation to destroy Athens echoes the strategic thinking about preserving enemy territory as leverage.
Read passage →Aristotle: Constitution of Athens (24)
Analyzes Athenian imperial income and its relationship to naval power, supporting the speaker's emphasis on money as the sinews of war.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does the speaker's willingness to ally with 'barbarians' reflect the transformation of Greek interstate relations from the Persian War period? What does this suggest about the escalation of conflict?
- Analyze the metaphor of enemy territory as a 'hostage.' How does this reveal different Greek approaches to warfare and diplomacy?
- Why does the speaker emphasize that 'war is a matter not so much of arms as of money'? How does this challenge traditional Greek military values?
- Compare this strategic assessment with modern asymmetric conflicts between naval and land powers. What parallels and differences emerge?