Today's Passage
This passage presents Pericles's strategic vision for Athens at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE).
Crawley Translation (1910)
“This, I think, is a tolerably fair account of the position of the Peloponnesians; that of Athens is free from the defects that I have criticized in them, and has other advantages of its own, which they can show nothing to equal. If they march against our country we will sail against theirs, and it will then be found that the desolation of the whole of Attica is not the same as that of even a fraction of Peloponnese; for they will not be able to supply the deficiency except by a battle, while we have plenty of land both on the islands and the continent. The rule of the sea is indeed a great matter. Consider for a moment. Suppose that we were islanders; can you conceive a more impregnable position? Well, this in future should, as far as possible, be our conception of our position. Dismissing all thought of our land and houses, we must vigilantly guard the sea and the city. No irritation that we may feel for the former must provoke us to a battle with the numerical superiority of the Peloponnesians. A victory would only be succeeded by another battle against the same superiority: a reverse involves the loss of our allies, the source of our strength, who will not remain quiet a day after we become unable to march against them. We must cry not over the loss of houses and land but of men’s lives; since houses and land do not gain men, but men them. And if I had thought that I could persuade you, I would have bid you go out and lay them waste with your own hands, and show the Peloponnesians that this at any rate will not make you submit.
Modern Translation
In my view, this fairly represents the Peloponnesian position. Athens's situation, by contrast, avoids the weaknesses I've identified in theirs and possesses unique advantages they cannot match. Should they invade our territory, we'll sail against theirs—and then it will become clear that devastating all of Attica differs fundamentally from destroying even a small portion of the Peloponnese. They cannot compensate for their losses without fighting a battle, whereas we possess abundant territory throughout the islands and mainland. Naval supremacy is truly decisive. Think about it: if we were islanders, could you imagine a more unassailable position? This perspective should guide our future strategy as much as possible. We must abandon all concern for our farms and homes, focusing instead on protecting the sea and the city. However much their loss may anger us, we cannot let it provoke us into battling the Peloponnesians' superior numbers. Victory would merely lead to another engagement against the same overwhelming forces; defeat would mean losing our allies—the foundation of our power—who would revolt the moment we couldn't suppress them. We should mourn not the loss of property and territory but of human lives; for buildings and land don't create people—people create them. Had I believed you would listen, I would have urged you to go forth and destroy them yourselves, demonstrating to the Peloponnesians that such losses will never force our submission.
Historical Context
This passage presents Pericles's strategic vision for Athens at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE). Speaking to the Athenian assembly, Pericles advocates for a defensive strategy based on naval supremacy rather than land warfare. He argues that Athens should abandon the countryside to Spartan invasion while using its fleet to strike at Peloponnesian territory. This radical strategy required Athenians to watch their farms burn while crowding behind the Long Walls connecting Athens to its port at Piraeus. Pericles's speech reflects Athens's transformation from a traditional Greek polis into a maritime empire, prioritizing imperial tribute and naval power over ancestral lands. This strategy would define the war's early years, though it would contribute to the devastating plague that struck the overcrowded city.
Key Themes
Annotations & References
Athenian Naval Strategy
Athens's navy of 300 triremes dominated the Aegean, enabling it to maintain its empire and import grain despite land invasions. This 'wooden wall' strategy echoed Themistocles's interpretation of the Delphic oracle before Salamis, making Athens effectively an island fortress connected to the sea by the Long Walls.
Learn more →The Long Walls
These parallel fortifications, completed around 458 BCE, connected Athens to Piraeus and Phalerum. They created a secure corridor to the sea, allowing Athens to withstand sieges indefinitely through naval supply lines. Their construction marked Athens's commitment to maritime rather than traditional hoplite warfare.
Learn more →Periclean Strategy
Pericles's defensive strategy avoided pitched battles with Sparta's superior infantry, instead leveraging Athens's financial reserves and naval dominance. This required extraordinary discipline from citizens watching their property destroyed, and its psychological costs contributed to Pericles's political downfall after the plague.
Learn more →Athenian Empire
By 431 BCE, Athens controlled over 400 allied cities paying annual tribute (phoros) totaling 400-600 talents. This revenue funded the fleet and allowed Athens to import necessities during the war. The empire's stability depended entirely on naval power to prevent revolts.
Learn more →Parallel Ancient Sources
Plutarch: Life of Pericles (33.4-6)
Plutarch describes the same strategic debate, emphasizing how Pericles restrained young Athenians eager to fight and noting that he 'shut up the city' like a ship in a storm, refusing to engage despite public pressure.
Read passage →Aristotle: Constitution of Athens (27.1-3)
Aristotle connects Athens's naval power to its democratic development, arguing that the common people who rowed the triremes gained political power after Salamis, supporting Pericles's emphasis on sea power as fundamental to Athenian identity.
Read passage →Pseudo-Xenophon: Constitution of the Athenians (2.14-16)
This contemporary source, though hostile to democracy, confirms Pericles's analysis of Athens's strategic advantages, noting how naval power allowed Athens to ravage enemy coasts while preventing effective retaliation against the empire's scattered territories.
Read passage →Discussion Questions
- How does Pericles's vision of Athens as effectively an island challenge traditional Greek values about land, ancestry, and citizenship?
- What are the psychological and social costs of a strategy that asks citizens to sacrifice their property for strategic advantage? Can modern parallels be drawn?
- How does Pericles's frank acknowledgment that Athens rules its allies by force complicate our understanding of Athenian democracy?
- To what extent does this passage reveal the transformation of warfare from aristocratic hoplite combat to total war involving entire populations?